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1 
REVIEW OP LITERATURE 
I 
The following dissertation is a theoretical and empir­
ical examination of the relationship "between rates of inter­
est over the range of debt maturity. The study examines the 
current status of what has come to be called "the term struc­
ture of interest rates", offers an alternative theoretical 
solution to the problem, and presents some empirical test re­
sults. 
While the question of interest rate structure covers 
all forms of debt which are publicly contracted, this study 
confines itself to marketable debt. Marketable debt refers 
to obligations of state, local, and federal governments, and 
corporate debt which are traded on the open market. The the­
oretical discussion of the rate structure is designed to in­
clude all marketable debt; however, due to the lack of ade­
quate data, the statistical tests are carried out only on 
marketable debt issued or guaranteed by the United States Gov 
ernment. This is common practice, and as we shall see, is 
particularly reasonable for the time period of our test data. 
II 
The term structure of interest rates has for some time 
been a problem of interest to economists both because of its 
2 
intriguing nature and because of its policy implications. 
We begin the examination of the problem with a review of the 
major theoretical contributions, and then proceed to offer an 
addition to current theory. 
The basic problem is this; how can essentially risk-
less^ securities, identical in every respect except term to 
maturity, have different yields? Over time the United States 
federal debt market has exhibited rising, falling, humped, 
and nearly flat yield curves. The body of term structure in­
quiry is concerned with discovering what sort of behavior or 
what forces allow short rates to lie below long rates in one 
instance and above them in another. What causes intermediate 
2 
rates occasionally to lie above both short and long rates? 
In another vein, what can be done to influence the shape 
of this yield curve? Such things as inventories and short-
term international capital flows are traditionally thought 
to be sensitive to the short-term rate; housing starts and 
heavy capital formation are thought to be sensitive to the 
^By a riskless security we mean one on which there is 
no risk of default. This does not rule out any capital gains 
or losses which the bond holder might experience as a result 
of simple price changes. 
2 Short, long, and intermediate have no exact maturity 
connotation. For practical purposes, three month Treasury 
bills are the shortest debt outstanding, while some govern­
ment and private bonds run up to and beyond twenty years. 
The United Kingdom has for years issued perpetual securities. 
3 
long-term rates. These rates are clearly matters with which 
policy makers are concerned. Can the two ends of the market 
be treated independently? Are they perhaps locked together? 
What policy tools are most effective in the market? The 
answers to these questions are not Immediately apparent. 
In order to keep this task manageable it has been con­
fined almost exclusively to examination of the relationship 
between rates. Policy prescriptions are left relatively un­
developed, though not excluded. 
So far a rather substantial body of literature on interest 
rate structure has arisen. So much has been written that we 
can cover only the major contributors in detail, leaving 
others to passing mention. At the outset we divide the lit­
erature into theoretical contributions and statistical tests. 
In order to establish the problem we shall in this section 
review only theoretical contributions. Statistical contri­
butions will be reviewed in a later chapter. 
For our purposes It Is sufficient to group the theoreti­
cal contributions into two schools of thought: the "expec­
tations" approach and the "market segmentation" approach. The 
expectations hypothesis posits that yield differentials arise 
as a result of expectations about future rates of interest. 
The segmentation hypothesis contends that investors do not 
view securities of different maturity as substitutes, and con-
I 
sequently that yield differentials arise because securities 
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are essentially separate commodities, each with its own supply 
and demand. The security market is then broken up into matur­
ity segments between which there is imperfect linkage. 
Though many previous authors (31) (37) (106) have noted 
a relationship between short-term rates and long-term rates, 
the current debate seems to stem from J,R. Hicks, Value and 
Capital (39). Hicks begins by examining the relationship be­
tween rates of interest on various maturity loans and con­
cludes that the entire loan structure can be thought of as com­
posed of current and future one-period loans. 
Having assumed all interest payments are held and paid 
together with the face value of a bond at maturity, certainty 
about future short-term rates of interest, no transactions 
costs, and perfect mobility of funds between markets he 
writes ; 
"Looking at it in this way, the rate of inter­
est for loans of two weeks running from our first 
Monday, is compounded out of the 'spot' rate of 
interest for loans of one week and the 'forward' 
rate of interest, also for one week loans, but for 
loans to be executed in the second week. If no 
interest is paid until the conclusion of the whole 
transaction then the same capital sum must be ar­
rived at by accumulating for two weeks at the two-
weeks rate of interest, or alternatively by accum­
ulating for one week at the one-week rate, and then 
accumulating for a second week at the 'forward' rate. 
The two transactions are ultimately identical," (39, 
p. 145) 
To place this relationship in algebraic terms we intro­
duce Meiselman's notation (57), This notation will be used 
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extensively in the remainder of the chapter. 
actual rate of interest 
expected rate 
expected n year rate (n = 1,2,...,) 
expected n year rate with expectation 
formed at time t. 
expected n year rate with expectation 
formed at time t; the rate is expected 
to prevail in time t+i, (1 = 1,2,...,). 
the two year rate of interest expected in 
1968 to prevail in 1970. 
Clearly, ^r^ = that is, the n year rate currently 
t 
expected to prevail over the next n years is identical to the 
current n year market rate. 
Defining analogously as the price on an n year 
security at time t, the total return on a bond maturing in n 
years is Suppose an investor is considering a 
two year investment. The return on a two year security will 
be ^PgCl+^Rg)^. Alternatively, the investor may Invest se­
quentially in two one-year securities. He would then be in­
vesting in one security at a known rate, ^.P^^Cl+^R^), and the 
second at an expected rate, (1+t+l^l^^* total return 
would then be t2i(l+tRi)(l+t+iri^)« Clearly he will choose 
the most profitable path. In Hicks' world of certainty 
R = 
r = 
t+l^nt ~ 
For example: 
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is known so that arbitrage will keep the holding per-
P ' 
iods equal; thus, = t^l^^"*'t%'^^'*'t+l^l )' for 
t 
simplicity, assume the same sunount of funds will go to either 
2 
market so that = t^2» hence (l+^Rg) = ( 1+t^l) 
(l+t+ir^ ). The ssune reasoning applies to an investor con-
t 
sidering 3 years, 4 years, etc. In general, the long-term 
rate is found to be the geometric mean of expected future 
short-term rates, that is; 
(^*t^n^ - |]l+t^lt)(^*t+l^ït)(l*t+2Zït)'''(l+t+n-l^lt^| • 
If short rates are expected to rise, the current long rate 
will exceed the current short rate, and this is termed an 
ascending yield curve. The converse is also true. 
Hicks however adds a final twist to the discussion by 
introducing Keynesian "backwardation". It is argued that 
borrowers typically wish to ensure the availability of ade­
quate funds for long periods of time as this assures smooth 
operation, but that lenders have no such desire. If any­
thing, lenders ordinarily prefer to lend for short periods of 
time in order to maintain liquidity; thus there develops a 
"constitutional" weakness which leads Hicks to conclude: 
"The forward short rate will thus exceed 
the expected short rate by a risk-premium which 
corresponds exactly to the "normal backwardation* 
of the commodities markets. If short rates are not 
expected to change in the future, the forward rate 
will exceed the current short rate by the extent 
of this premium; if short rates are expected to 
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rise, the excess will be greater than this nor­
mal level; it is only if short rates are expected 
to fall that the forward rate can be below the 
current rate." (39, p. 14?) 
These issues then become the two fundamental ones about 
which term structure theory revolves; Is it actually the 
case that the long-term rate can be no more than the mean of 
the expected future short-term rates, or can there be other 
influences? And, secondly, is there actually a constitutional 
weakness in the market which gives rise to liquidity premia 
in the longer maturities? For the most part these questions 
are empirical ones, but they are at the core of the problem 
and emerge again and again. 
In the Hicksian theory and in the theories that follow, 
the reader's attention will be particularly directed toward 
the role of the investment period or "horizon". The funda­
mental issues mentioned above are intimately connected with 
the horizon, and it is the contention of this writer that the 
horizon must be considered as part of an investor's decision 
process. This contention will be supported in Chapter II, 
so we pay particular attention to the role of horizon in the 
coming literature review, 
Lutz (51) is the second major contributor to the expec­
tations hypothesis. He starts from nearly the same premises 
as Hicks but examines the case in somewhat more detail. Lutz, 
like Hicks, assumes there is no investment cost, no default 
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risk, and perfect mobility of funds on either side of the 
market, but adds the notable improvement of removing the 
assumption of perfect foresight. This allows investors to 
hold differing expectations about future short-term rates. 
Lutz also differs from Hicks on the issue of liquidity 
premia. Suppose there is an investor who holds a bond which 
matures in the same length of time for which he thinks his 
funds are available. If the investor changes maturity he 
trades a certain return for an uncertain one, therefore a 
positive premium will be required to draw him into another 
maturity. "It is not legitimate, therefore, to conclude 
(with Hicks) that the effect of the risk factor, as such, 
must necessarily be to make long rates higher than shorter 
ones," (51, p. 512) Lutz essentially concludes that risk 
factors (or "liquidity premia") can exist in either end of 
the market, but the observation is made in passing and not 
formalized. 
The major contribution of Lutz is the removal of the 
assumption of perfect foresight on the part of investors. 
Assuming there are only two markets available, a long and a 
short, the investor will enter that which he expects to yield 
the greatest return for a particular time. The question to 
resolve is which market offers the greatest return? Lutz 
writes of the investor: 
"He will discount the price at which he 
9 
expects to sell the bond at the time when he 
wants to disinvest (this price is dependent on 
what he anticipates the long rate will be at 
that date ) and all the Interest payments up to 
that time, back to the present moment, using as 
the discount factor for each year the short rate 
which he expects to prevail in that year." (51, p. 513) 
This procedure gives the investor a "subjective" price for 
the bond which he compares with the current market price. 
If the Investor's subjective price is above the market price 
then the bond is undervalued by the market and the maximum 
profit can be obtained by investing in a long-term security. 
If his subjective price is below the market price, the bond 
is overvalued and the investor gets the maximum return by in­
vesting sequentially in short-term securities. This process 
allows the Investor to decide which market yields the great­
est return for the particular time he intends to invest. The 
horizon is assumed to be fixed by non-market factors and plays 
no part in the Investment decision. The presumption is that 
all investors undertake this sort of calculation so that each 
is placing his funds on the basis of what he expects future 
short-term rates to be. The change from Hicks* approach is 
that investors, while certain of expectations, hold diverse 
ones. The yield curve will then reflect these diverse expec­
tations in a rising, falling, or level pattern. The exact 
method by which the yield curve is established is as follows. 
The discounting procedure introduces two sets of expec­
tations into the analysis; that of the individual investor 
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and that of the "market". The current long rate expresses 
the market's expectation of future short-term rates, and as 
we have seen, the individual Investor has his own set of ex­
pectations which may or may not agree with the market. Lutz 
further argues that the individual's expectation of future 
long-term rates need not be consistent with his expectation 
of future short-term rates. 
"In the present case, however, an investor's 
personal expectations about the future course of 
short rates do not necessarily commit him as to his 
expectations about the long rate, since the latter 
depends, not on what he thinks about the future 
short rates, but what the 'market', i.e. other 
people, think about them. The individual investor 
therefore, may quite reasonably form an opinion 
about the future long rate which is inconsistent 
with his opinion about future short rates. Prom 
this it follows that an investor, if he discounts, 
as above, the bond price expected at the end of 
his entire Investment period plus the interest 
payments up to that time, and obtains a 'subjective' 
bond value which is below (or above) the current 
bond price, will not necessarily go into the short 
market (or the long market) now." (51, p. 514) 
It is then argued that the possibility of inconsistent 
expectations gives rise to two alternative investment pat­
terns, The investor may expect that at some Intermediate 
date the yield to maturity on his bond may rise above or. 
fall below the average of short rates. If this is the case 
he may discount, as before, that high or low price back to 
the present. If that discounted price is above the current 
bond price the investor may enter the long market first with 
the Intention of shifting to the short market later. If the 
11 
discounted price is below the market price the investor would 
enter the short market now with the intention of shifting to 
the long market later. 
These cases of expectation could clearly be complicated 
by introducing a subjective bond price which moves either 
above or below the expected future short rates in several 
places. The result is that any pattern of rates can be ex­
plained. 
Suppose that we begin from an equilibrium position in 
which all rates are equal. Now let expectations change so 
that most investors expect future short-term rates to rise. 
Different people will clearly have different expectations 
about the amount of rise. Investors whose subjective bond 
price is below the market price will enter the short market 
(now) while those whose subjective evaluations are above cur­
rent prices will enter the long market. On the assumption 
that most investors expect rates to rise, there will be a 
general shift of funds into the short market and out of the 
long market, driving the short rate down and driving the long 
rate up. The tendency for long rates to rise will be stopped 
by the equality of supply and demand for funds in each market, 
smd the entrance to the short market of all investors with a 
subjective price below the market price (51» P» 516). 
The process of readjustment can conveniently be sum­
marized by Figure 1,1 from Lutz (51). It is assumed that the 
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Figure 1.1. Interest rate equilibrium of Lutz 
total volume of funds available for investment is the fixed 
amount ON. and Dg are demand curves for long and short 
funds respectively, where Dg is drawn with N as the origin 
and is drawn with 0 as the origin. Initially CB is the 
rate pattern which leads to OL Invested in longs and ML in 
shorts. When the expectation of a rise in rates is intro­
duced, CA emerges as the array of differing subjective ex­
pected future long-term rates. The new expectation will draw-
additional funds out of the long market into the short market. 
This movement will drive rates down in the short market and 
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drive rates up in the long market. The shifting will con­
tinue until, as noted, all who have a subjective bond price 
below the current price are in the short market and the supply 
and demand for funds in each market are equal. We observe on 
the diagram that shifting ceases when OM funds are in the long 
market and KN are in the short market. At this point there is 
no further tendency for funds to move between markets and the 
equilibrium rate-spread is PE since OE is the long rate and 
OF is the short rate. 
The same sort of analysis would obtain if rates were 
expected to fall. In this case the line OA which arrays sub­
jective bond rates would fall below CB so that funds would 
flow out of the short market into the long market. The 
equilibrium rate-spread thus obtained would be with short 
rates above long rates. Obviously, the only case consistent 
with a level yield curve is when investors expect no change 
in future rates. 
In many ways this analysis is similar to that of Hicks, 
and the two taken together form the cornerstone of the ex­
pectations theory. 
Lutz, however, is not without his critics. Luckett (49) 
has pointed out some internal inconsistencies in the Lutz 
model and has criticized the expectations approach on other 
grounds as well. 
Luckett first points out that Lutz has introduced two 
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demand curves for funds, yet simultaneously assumes perfect 
mobility on the part of both lenders and borrowers. 
"The ability of lenders to place their funds 
in either market Is perfect; there is friction-
less movement in either direction. But curiously, 
we find the exact opposite extreme on the borrowing 
side of the market. Here we find that people seeking 
funds are committed to either the long-term market 
or the short-term market. They cannot exercise 
that option which lutz has previously assumed to 
exist, of borrowing for short periods and regu­
larly renewing as an alternative to borrowing 
long." (49, p. 137) 
More Important to the theory are Luckett's comments on 
the investor's capacity to form inconsistent expectations 
about future long and short rates, 
"But surely the behavior of this single 
investor will then warp the rate pattern so 
that it no longer reflects the 'market's' ex­
pectations about the future course of Interest 
rates. And is not the market made up, after 
all, of individual investors? If they form in­
dependent expectations about the course of long-
term rates — expectations, that is, which are 
inconsistent with what they anticipate will 
occur in the short-term market — then the rate 
pattern is based on what everyone thinks every­
one else thinks: long rates have no relevancy 
to short rates. (49, p. 139) 
Despite the theoretical problems which are involved, 
Lutz's approach is a significant extentlon of and improve­
ment on Hicks' approach, 
Luckett's final, and perhaps major, criticism is 
leveled not at Lutz per se but at the general approach of 
which Lutz is typical (49, p, 140), Luckett points out that 
there are two methods by which an investor can arrive at his 
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"subjective" bond price. He can independently form expecta­
tions about long term rates or he can discount an expected 
sale price by using expected one year rates to the bond's 
maturity (49, p. 140)« The first approach leads to the 
theoretical problems we have been discussing, the second re­
quires the investor to estimate future short rates n years 
into the future. This second alternative, Luckett contends, 
is clearly not reasonable. 
"We are thus treated to the spectacle of 
an individual standing on the eve of World War 
II, atomic bombs, the cold war, the postwar in­
flation, the Employment Act of 1946, et hoc genus 
omne. trying to decide what short-term interest 
rates will be fifteen to twenty years in the fu­
ture. It will not do to rebut that we know these 
things only by hindsight. That is the whole 
point. The future is pregnant with so many pos­
sibilities that there is no basis in knowledge on 
which to form a prediction of short-term interest 
rates a generation hence, and no rational person 
could venture such a prediction." (49, p. I4l) 
This is a well-taken criticism and is one which can be 
applied to virtually all expectations models. Note par-
i 
ticularly that this is a criticism of the arbitrarily long 
horizon. The model allows no change in horizon resulting 
from market forces. As we shall see it is this provision 
and the liquidity premium question which give rise to vari­
ations on the basic Hicks-Lutz model. 
Malkiel (53) (54) (55) has taken one of the better the­
oretical expectations approaches, Malkiel argues that bonds, 
for the most part, are traded by professionals on the basis 
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of price, not yield (55» p. 51). The consideration of bond 
price movements, then, is of paramount concern. This factor, 
along with an expected normal range of rates and expectations 
proper, are the three factors upon which his theory is built 
(55, p. 50). 
The beginning statement of Malkiel's theory is a set of 
five theorems concerning the mathematics of bond price move­
ments. For our purposes only the first two are relevant; the 
remaining three add detail but not substance. Assuming that 
all bonds carry the same coupon, and that the yield curve is 
flat, he proves: 
Theorem 1; Bond prices move inversely to bond 
yields. 
Theorem 2: For a given change in yield from the 
nominal yield, changes in bond prices 
are greater, the longer the term to 
maturity. (55, p. 54) 
At this point the second factor, an expected normal 
range of rates, is introduced, Malkiel posits that investors 
expect rates to remain within the historically established 
bounds of (say) 2 per cent to 5 per cent. A horizon over 
which investors plan alternative strategies is also intro­
duced, and assumed to be one year. Like Lutz, Malkiel ar­
bitrarily fixes the horizon and allows it no substantive role 
in the decision process. It is nevertheless this shorter 
horizon which presumably eliminates the problem of guessing 
at short rates n years in the future. 
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Paraphrasing liberally from Malkiel, we follow his 
example. Suppose the yield curve were level at 4^ per cent. 
Investors have no expectations about whether rates will rise 
or fall, but clearly must be concerned about what could hap­
pen. While rates are expected to stay in the 2 per cent to 
5 per cent historical range a rate fall from to 2 per cent 
in one years seems unlikely. The probable lower bound is (say) 
per cent, but the upper bound is 5 per cent as rates could 
be expected to rise to 5 per cent within the year quite 
easily. Investors are then certain that rates will lie be­
tween and 5 per cent over the year. 
This situation leaves more to hope than to fear, even 
in the absence of explicit expectations about rate changes. 
The worst that could happen would be a rise in rates (to 5 
per cent) subjecting investors to capital losses. The best 
that could happen would be a fall in rates (to per cent) 
giving Investors capital gains. Since no explicit expecta­
tion about the direction of rate change Is allowed, investors 
are assumed to regard the alternative events of a rate rise 
and rate fall as equally likely. In this example the lower 
bound is farther from the current rate than the upper bound 
which, regarding rise and fall as equally likely, produces a 
mathematical expectation of gain which is larger than the 
mathematical expectation of loss. This being the case, in­
vestors will move to the long-term end of the market where 
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(by Theorem 2) price changes will be greatest. This move­
ment drives the long rate down and drives the short rate up 
until equilibrium is reached with a descending yield curve. 
The same sort of reasoning holds if rates are near the 
lower bound of the historical range. Rates at (say) 
leave more to fear than to hope as the maximum price decline 
is greater than the maximum rise. This condition makes the 
mathematical expectation of loss greater than the mathematical 
expectation of gain so that investors are drawn to the short­
est maturities to protect against price declines. This 
shifting drives short rates down and long rates up until 
equilibrium is again reached, but with an ascending yield 
structurel. 
The yield structures have been explained with the only 
expectation being that of a normal range of rates. Malkiel 
then introduces the third factor; expectations proper. The 
investor may, for example, attach 0,75 probability to a rate 
rise and 0.25 to a rate fall. Assuming that all possible out­
comes can be represented by a Von Neumann-Morgenstem utility 
index, each event is weighted by its probability and that act 
with the highest utility index is chosen. While, as we have 
seen, it is the position of current rates vis à vis the nor-
^Malkiel points out that he uses the extreme changes 
only as an example. As long as the situation leaves more to 
hope than fear, or vice versa, the results will be the same, 
in the absence of direct expectation, as if any other arbi­
trary points had been used. 
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mal range that determines whether the yield curve rises or 
falls, it is the probability attached to the event of rate 
rise or rate fall which determines the curve's slope (55, 
p. 65). That is, the position of rates currently still dic­
tates where the largest expected gain (smallest loss) will 
occur, but these gains and losses are weighted by the proba­
bility assigned to each. If the "market" attaches a partic­
ular probability to (say) a rate fall when rates are near the 
upper bound, the curve descends more sharply than in the state 
with no expectations. The converse involves the same rea­
soning,^ 
This model is a significant improvement over Hicks-lutz 
as it apparently removes the problem of guessing at future 
short rates. As Luckett writes, "To put the matter as suc­
cinctly as possible, the Hlcks-Lutz theory assumes long-term 
forecasts of short-term rates, whereas the Malklel theory 
assumes short-term forecasts of long-term rates," (47, p. 323) 
Malklel arbitrarily introduces a one year horizon with 
which the entire market is assumed to operate. But at the 
same time he refers to his rate changes and investor's 
expectations as "within the year" (55» p. 6I), We are not 
really sure what the horizon is, yet the entire market pre-
^Presumably the "market" is some sort of an average of 
individual expectations, Malklel makes no explicit state­
ment about this. 
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Bumably acts on this horizon. We shall have more to say 
about the horizon problem in the next chapter. 
Luckett (47) draws together Mallclel and Hlcks-Lutz by 
demonstrating that the two theories are actually mathemati­
cally the same. Following luckett, we have seen that the 
Hicks-Lutz expectations model leads to, 
(1+t®n) - (l+t^lt)(^^t+1^1^)•••(1+t+n-l^lt^' 
If we ignore liquidity premia, institutional constraints, etc, 
then an unbiased estimate of the relevant future short rate is: 
Since investors are assumed to try to maximize the return over 
any period of time, arbitrage will keep holding periods equal. 
That is, arbitrage will insure that covering a ten year period, 
by ten one-year bonds, two five-year bonds, five two-year 
bonds, etc., or any combination thereof will yield the same 
expected return. Luckett then argues that Hicks-Lutz and 
Malklel have in common the feature of equal holding period 
yields resulting from maximizing behavior on the part of the 
investor (47, p. 323). 
Defining t-1^+1 the expected holding period yield 
during t-1 on the n+1 maturity, Luckett assumes that the mar­
ket acts so that, 
— t—l^n+i ~ 1,2,...). Equation 1 
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defined to be the price of the n+1 maturity 
at t-1 and p as the price which must be expected to pre-
t n 
vail next year so that Equation 1 holds. 
"Then (2) t-l^+i ~ tPn~t-l^^+i making the 
t-l^n+1 
standard Hicksian assumption that all interest 
payments are made at maturity. The existence of 
the expected price ^p^ taken together with the 
known terminal value of the bond, ^  
is sufficient to define an expected long-term 
rate of interest such that (3) 
(1+ r )" = ." (47, p. 323) 
* °t-l tPn 
Luckett argues that this is a fair statement of Malkiel's 
hypothesis since there is the implication of a one period 
horizon, and identical holding period yields, 
"it is equally true, however, that equation (3) 
implies a forecast of a series of forward short-
term rates for each year into the future. This is 
so because as we have seen, the assumption of 
equal holding period yields implies an expected 
structure of rates at t. And any structure of 
rates, whether realized or expected, can be looked 
at in the usual Hicks-Lutz fashion to determine a 
series of expected short-term rates for each year 
in the future. Thus we may write: 
, .n+1 
(47. p. 324) 
"-.v..'" 
Luckett then proceeds to demonstrate that statements 
3 and 4 are mathematically equivalent. The point, of course. 
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is that forming expectations about a whole structure of 
rates is the same as forming expectations about a series of 
future short-term rates because these short rates are implied 
in any complete rate structure; you cannot have one without 
the other. The presumed advantage over the Hicks-lutz model 
gained by introducing a short horizon is revealed to be no 
gain at all. We still have investors operating on the basis 
of a long series of expected future short-term rates, and the 
horizon is still arbitrary. 
This review gives the flavor of expectations hypotheses. 
The participants are assumed to be free of institutional 
barriers and have no maturity preferences; funds are imagined 
perfectly mobile, and, most important, investors are imagined 
capable of predicting short rates into the indefinite future. 
For the most part, any horizons introduced are arbitrary and 
do not enter into the decision process. 
Despite these apparent drawbacks, statistical tests of 
the expectations hypothesis provide rather strong support. As 
is the case with most controversy, however, the results are 
subject to criticism and are, to some extent, open to inter­
pretation. Since there is a substantial body of purely sta­
tistical tests of hypotheses presented herein, we defer dis­
cussion of them to a later chapter. 
Ill 
We turn now to an alternative approach to the term struc­
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ture problem, the "market segmentation" hypothesis,^ The 
major proponents of this hypothesis are Culbertson (23) and 
to a lesser extent Modigliani and Sutch (60) (61) and 
Michaelson (58) (59). In general this approach has been 
considered only residually; institutional considerations if 
allowed at all, have been relegated to explaining liquidity 
premia, or have been unsupported by statistical tests. To 
my knowledge Culbertson is the only author who has started 
from a purely segmentation point of view and tried to reason 
from that point to an explanation of observed rate structure. 
As we will see, even his approach is not theoretically for­
mal. 
The segmentation hypothesis argues that the major in­
fluence in the term structure comes from an independent 
supply and demand for each debt maturity, where these matu­
rities are weak substitutes at best, Culbertson writes: 
"Rates on short-term and long-term U,S, 
government securities, which are tied to rates 
on related private debt, characteristically 
move simultaneously in the same direction in 
the short run (over periods of weeks and 
months), with short-term rates changing over 
the wider range. The general coincidence of 
movement in rates reflects basically the 
simultaneous impact in various credit markets 
of changes in general credit conditions re­
sulting from changes in business conditions and 
monetary policy, and substitutability between 
short-term and long-term debt on the part of both 
^This is occasionally refered to as the "institutional" 
hypothesis, 
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borrowers and lenders. However, this substl-
tutability is limited in extent, and when the 
maturity structure of debt supplied to the econ­
omy undergoes a substantial short-run change-
either because of Treasury debt management 
operations or actions of private borrowers, 
this is reflected in the rate structure. 
Yields on short-term debt average lower than 
those on long-term debt because of the ad­
vantage of the superior liquidity of such debt 
to the holder and the liquidity disadvantage 
of issuing such debt to private borrowers. The 
amount of the liquidity premiums reflected in 
the term structure can vary with changes in the 
maturity structure of outstanding debt and with 
other factors affecting marginal preferences for 
liquidity in investment assets. Behavior based 
upon interest rate expectations is important 
mainly as a factor determining very short-run 
movements in long-term rates. Such behavior 
is based mainly on near-term expectations, and 
is ordinarily of little Importance in deter­
mining average rate levels, and relationships 
over considerable periods of time." (25, pp. 488-489) 
This quotation is a fair summary of Culbertson's posi­
tion which he further supports by examining, "Pour major fac­
tors underlying the market's relative valuation of short-
term and long-term debt.,," (23, p. 489). These are: 
liquidity, speculation, supply changes in the face of rigid 
demand, and differences in costs. 
Concerning liquidity, Culbertson argues that it is es­
sentially the ability to convert quickly to cash at a rea­
sonably certain price. Since no investor has perfect fore­
sight and few are willing to act as if they had, each must 
have some concern about liquidity to handle unforeseen con­
tingencies. 
"Particular future cash needs differ in (1) 
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the degree to which their timing is certain 
ranging from definite liabilities to pay 
given taxes on a certain day to completely 
uncertain contingencies, and in (2) the near­
ness or remoteness of the time at which they 
will arise or are most likely to arise," (23, p. 492) 
Each of these obligations must be matched by the appropriate 
liquidity. This leads to the general borrowing rule of 
matching the debt to the length of time for which the funds 
are needed or the type of asset to be purchased with the 
funds (23, p. 494). Given these considerations there Is 
little room for speculation. The rate differences arising 
out of liquidity premla, which are not the entire difference 
between rates, should then be responsive to supply changes In 
the outstanding debt. 
Turning to speculation based on Interest rate expec­
tations, Culbertson argues that a great many factors must 
be taken into account for each investor. Assets from which 
to choose, time periods for comparison, scale of operation, 
the market in which to operate, the investor's frame of ref­
erence, etc., are all factors relevant to expectations deter­
mination. These factors are sufficiently unique and unstable 
for each investor so that, "...the net effect of speculative 
activity is not usually something that is clear and definite, 
but is rather the net result of individual patterns of oper­
ation that are diverse and in many cases inconsistent," (23, 
p. 496) 
It is thus argued that speculation is of little Impor-
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tance overall and any influence which it does exert is 
limited to very short-run considerations. This is so be­
cause near-term expectations are the only ones well enough 
formed to act upon, and because short-term speculation gives 
greater returns as a result of short period price fluctua­
tions (25, p. 497). Culbertson also points out that so many 
profitable opportunities have been passed over that it is 
difficult to see how speculators could stay in business. 
Most investment, Culbertson argues, is non-speculative; an 
investor selects a portfolio according to his maturity needs 
and based upon past earnings, and holds it through short-run 
shifts, whatever they may be (23, p. 499). 
The third of the four factors to be considered is that 
of supply. Up to this point a reasonably strong case has 
been made that an investor's maturity holdings are generally 
not a matter of indifference — that funds are not perfectly 
mobile, and that liquidity needs do exist. It then follows 
from this that the term structure will be affected by supply 
changes in the outstanding debt. There are, of course, 
changes in the demand for debts of different maturity, but 
such factors as legal restrictions on Institutional holdings, 
diversification desires, geographical Immobility of funds, 
etc., serve to maintain some rigidity of demand, and thus 
enhance the supply effects. 
The fourth factor, relative costs, is generally regarded 
as not significant and is, therefore, ignored. 
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IV 
This brief review gives us some familiarity with the 
term structure problem. We have purposely not covered each 
detail, nor covered all of the contributors. The contri­
butors which we have not covered will be discussed in the 
statistical section since most other contributions arise 
only as sidelights of statistical testing. We have covered 
the main theoretical approaches. 
The contrast between these approaches is a sharp one. 
On the one hand, expectations theorists regard market par­
ticipants as motivated entirely by expectations and a desire 
to maximize return over some indeterminate or arbitrary time 
horizon. Investors have no qualms about Jumping from short 
maturities to long and back as their expectations demand, and 
feel perfectly safe in extending expectations well into the 
future. No quarter is allowed for hedging against a date 
when an investor might know with certainty he will exit the 
market. All securities are viewed as perfect substitutes. 
The other hand offers the segmentation theorists, who 
regard markex participants as having definite, fixed horizons 
which they try to match. Market participants do not trust 
their expectations beyond a very short period of time and 
generally do not act upon them because they are so uncertain. 
Securities of different maturity are not substitutes in any 
significant degree, but are attractive only to the extent that 
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they fill a specific maturity need. For the most part expec­
tations are regarded as so uncertain and diverse that they 
exert no significant force over the long run. As a result, 
investors operate in a given maturity range which they will 
not leave under ordinary circumstances. 
At the outset we questioned what could be done about the 
yield structure from a policy point of view. Ve are now in 
a position to notice that there are opposing points of view 
here. The expectations hypothesis implies that, since the 
term structure is insensitive to debt maturity structure, the 
monetary authorities can exercise policy only if they can 
influence expectations (46) (109). Alternatively, the seg­
mentation hypothesis argues that securities are not perfect 
substitutes so that the term structure will react to supply 
changes. If this is the case, the monetary authority can 
influence the yield structure with open market operations. 
Which of these explanations holds is therefore not only a 
matter of theoretical concern, but is of eminent practical 
concern. 
The current writer is not convinced that either explan­
ation is complete. Each has objectionable features and each 
has its undeniable truths. The expectations hypothesis has 
Impressive empirical support bu-t has the objectionable horizon 
problem. Culbertson's approach, while Introducing a much 
needed maturity preference clause, is decidedly not rigorous. 
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He maintains that the major portion of the yield curve can 
be explained by supply and demand for particular maturities, 
with expectations oriented activity having only a minor in­
fluence. But this is all put forth mostly by assertion. It 
will be the task of the next chapter to take a closer look 
at the segmentation approach and try to devise a blend of the 
two approaches.! Following that we will review statistical 
work to date and then apply some additional tests. 
for syntheses already undertaken see Malkiel (55), 
Modigliani and Sutch (60) (61), and Meiselman (57), to be 
reviewed later. 
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THEORETICAI, DEVELOPMENT 
I 
It is the purpose of this chapter to present an addition 
to current term structure theory. We begin the chapter with 
a brief look at a pure segmentation hypothesis, and then de­
velop a blend of the segmentations and expectations hypotheses. 
The primary characteristic of a pure segmentation hypoth­
esis is that participants on both sides of the market have 
maturity preferences which override all other considerations. 
That is, borrowers and lenders have maturity preferences which 
are generated by some non-market concern so that market forces 
alone are insufficient to move them from one maturity range to 
another. 
In its purest form, the segmentation hypothesis posits 
that participants on both sides of the market are risk averse 
in the extreme. They are presumed to know exactly (or hold an 
estimate with certainty) the date upon which they wish to leave 
the market and are uninterested in speculating on returns in 
other maturities. The primary reason these risk averse par­
ticipants are in the market at all is either to get necessary 
financing or to earn some rate of return greater than the 
zero (and sometimes negative) return on idle funds. The dom­
inant consideration of lenders is the capital certainty which 
comes from matching a known liquidation date with a security 
of Just that length. In this manner a lender can also assure 
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himself of a known rate of return. The borrowers know with 
certainty the cost of borrowing by issuing securities which 
have a maturity just matching the length of time for which the 
funds are needed. In both cases there is no trade-off between 
maturity and yield. Lenders sure unwilling to trade certain 
return and safety even though an alternative maturity might 
offer higher expected returns. Borrowers are unwilling to 
exchange the certainty associated with a given maturity even 
though lower costs might be expected in an alternative matur­
ity. 
The force which motivates behavior here is a non-market 
force; participants subjugate lending and borrowing decisions 
to what we might term a structure of "obligations". Lenders 
know at what date their obligations require that their funds 
be returned. For example, an insurance company knows just 
when its policies become paid-up and, consequently, it knows 
when it will need its funds back. Borrowers know at what 
date the project to be financed will be completed. For ex­
ample, a manufacturer knows just when a machine will wear out 
and, consequently, he knows how long he will need funds before 
the machine has paid for itself. 
But this pure segmentation approach can not explain ob­
served rate structures. The participants are assumed to act 
wholly from non-market forces, and thus the provision that 
there exists no trade-off between maturity and yield means 
there is no market. A market requires a supply, a demand, and 
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a price to which both react. The pure segmentation hypoth­
esis does not allow participants to react to price. The 
supply and demand for any maturity security consists entirely 
of two points; a supply point, and demand point. 
To obtain fruitful results we must modify the pure seg­
mentation hypothesis at least enough to establish a market. 
There are a number of modifications which could be introduced; 
the most obvious modification is to include some concern on 
the part of the participant about yield. Additionally, un­
certainty should also be introduced. Properly introduced, 
these modifications should lead to a more plausable hypothesis. 
If we examine the pure segmentation hypothesis behavior 
of the participants it becomes clear how to introduce yield 
concern and uncertainty. First, participants in the segmenta­
tion hypothesis are unconcerned about yield; any shifting done 
is for reasons other than yield. Behavior will obviously be 
altered if yield considerations are introduced. Second, 
there are two places where uncertainty can occur in this model: 
(1) participants may be uncertain about yield; and (2) they 
may be uncertain about the due dates of obligations. The in­
troduction of (1) essentially introduces expectations. When 
yield comparisons are allowed we essentially allow the par­
ticipants to speculate about alternative methods of financing 
for a known period of time. The only way to invest or borrow 
for a known period of time (say 10 years) with certainty of 
yield is to operate in that period (10 year) maturity. To 
move away from that maturity by comparing alternative ways of 
financing for the period is to allow market participants to 
have expectations about the future course of yields. For 
example, the only way to invest for 10 years with certainty 
of return is to buy a bond which matures in 10 years and hold 
it to maturity. Should the investor consider investing for 
the same period by sequentially purchasing 2-five year bonds, 
he must invest in the second at an expected rate. This will 
be true of any combination of bonds leading to the end of the 
10 year period. 
The introduction of (2) injects uncertainty into that 
obligation structure which motivates market participation. A 
lender or borrower may not be certain about the length of time 
he wishes to be in the market. Rather than estimating time in 
the market as a point, he may estimate it as a range. This 
range will be narrower or wider as he is in greater or lesser 
degree certain of the obligation due date. This range of pos­
sible obligation due dates will be referred to as a "horizon"» 
A horizon can be viewed as an integral part of the decis-
ion-making mechanism not only for a participant with maturity 
preferences but for a speculator as well. Indeed a horizon 
is Implicit in any decision an expectations-oriented partic­
ipant makes. If, for example, rates are expected to rise they 
cannot reasonably be expected to rise indefinitely. The spec­
ulator must expect that at some point rates will level off or 
fall; he may simply refuse to form expectations beyond a point. 
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but any of these expected changes produces a horizon. Any 
expected rate change, for example, calls for one strategy to 
the change point and another after that pointé But the time 
range in which the change is expected to occur serves the 
same function as a horizon determined by a non-market obli­
gation structure. Similarly, the end of the range over which 
expectations are formulated acts as a horizon. Both become 
integral parts of the investment decision, and should not be 
established arbitrarily. 
Let us now combine our yield and uncertainty modifica­
tions to the segmentation hypothesis in a somewhat more for­
mal model. We first examine the demand side under the modi­
fications. There are four general cases of uncertainty and 
yield expectations: 
1. The lender is certain about the horizon and 
certain about the future course of interest 
rates. 
2. The lender is certain about the future course 
of interest rates and uncertain about the 
horizon. 
3. The lender is certain about the horizon and 
uncertain about the future course of interest 
rates. 
4. The lender is uncertain about both the future 
course of interest rates and the horizon. 
Case 1 
Case 1 is uninteresting: since expectations are held 
with certainty and the horizon is certain, the lender need 
only pick the most profitable path for the known horizon. 
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This case is akin to that of pure segmentation behavior. 
Pure segmentation behavior is actually a special case where 
horizons are one point and known and lenders are certain about 
rates for only one path to the horizon. That path to the hor­
izon which is certain is the purchase of a security which ma­
tures at the horizon. This is the only certain path while in 
the general case lenders are certain about all paths to the 
known horizon. 
Case 2 
Consider a lender who holds a set of interest rate ex­
pectations with certainty. We now assume that investors have 
some trade-off between yield and maturity. Since we have 
assumed certainty of expectations about interest rates the 
uncertainty is involved in the horizon. Uncertainty, however, 
is not to be equated with ignorance. We assume that the lender 
has some expectation about probable liquidation dates based, 
possibly, on past experience. 
Suppose the lender has an expected liquidation date in 
mind. He expects, for any given obligation, that he will have 
to liquidate his holdings at time, t+k-i ^  t+k <1 t«fk+3, where 
t represents the current time, and k is some number repre­
senting that period in the future when the obligation is most 
likely to come due. Since the due date is not held with cer­
tainty, 1 and j represent the number of periods on either side 
of k in which the obligation might come due. Depending on the 
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investor, i and j may be equal or unequal. 
We assume the lender expects the liquidation date to 
arrive in t+k-i < t+k <t+k+j periods and subjectively assigns 
a probability to the obligation falling due in each period, 
Further, we posit that this is a distribution covering the 
lender's entire range of expectations so the P(k-i) + 
P(k-i+l) + P(k-i+2) + ... + P(k) + P(k+1) + P(k+2) + ... + 
P(k+j) = 1 where P(k) is the probability of the event falling 
in that period. In principle, this distribution can be of any 
form, but for the examples a 3 period distribution will be 
used. For the following exposition assumeî P(k-l) + P(k) + 
P(k+1) = 1. 
There will be, to any given point in time, a number of 
possible investment paths. Since the Investor expects with 
certainty a particular set of rates in the future, he can 
specify a return for each possible liquidation period on any 
given investment path. The lender is thus concerned only 
about the most profitable of these paths. The returns gotten 
by investing from time t to any of the three expected liqui­
dation dates can be displayed in a square matrix as shown in 
Figure 2.1. The rows are possible liquidation dates, and the 
columns are the most profitable path to a given point. 
For example, if the lender should pick the most profit­
able path to k-1 and the liquidation date should actually 
fall in k-1 periods, then the expected return would be a^^, 
(The lender in this example assigns probability zero to the 
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k-1 
^11 ®12 ^13 
Possible 
liquidation k agi C
VJ 
^23 dates 
CVJ 
k+1 
^31 ^32 ^33 
k-1 k k+1 
Most profitable path to 
Figure 2.1. Return matrix 
obligation falling due before k-1 or after k+1 periods.) 
Should he take the most profitable path for k periods when 
the liquidation date falls in k-1, the expected return is 
^ 1 
812" 
^This approach imposes certain restrictions on the matrix. 
The first restriction is: 
ai25ÊEi22~s-33^» •'^^nn* Condition 1 
agg cannot be less than a^]^ because the investor could cover 
k periods by investing to k-1 and holding cash from k-1 to k, 
thereby making ^22 least as large as ai^. The same reason­
ing holds for a^jj and a22* 
Each of the off-diagonal elements must be equal to or 
less than its corresponding diagonal elements. Consider a2]_» 
the return for an investor who invests short of the actual due 
date. On the assumption that he plans to hold cash if he 
guesses short, he gets a^^ but suffers the opportunity cost of 
having invested wrong. Had he invested correctly agg "would 
have obtained so that (footnote continued on following page) 
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We assume that the lender's preference function is a 
function of profit and risk and can be represented by a Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility index,^ By comparing all of the 
(footnote continued from previous page) agg - is the op­
portunity cost of mis-investing. In general: 
aij = 2ajj - aj^j^ all . Condition 2 
Since assumptions other than that the investor holds cash 
over the interurn are permissable, however. Condition 2 may 
be altered or invalidated, We might, for example, assume 
that if he guesses short he invests sequentially in one period 
securities until the obligation falls due. 
Because of Condition 1 and the investor's option to 
invest to a point and then hold cash: 
a n ^ c a . a l l  i > 3  C o n d i t i o n  2 '  
and ^ ^3*1 
^i3~^i+l,3 j' Condition 2" 
Elements in the lower left triangle both horizontally and 
vertically decline from (or are equal to) their diagonal ele­
ments. 
The upper right triangle elements result from the lender 
being surprised long rather than short; he finds the obligation 
due before expected. These elements must be smaller than or 
equal to corresponding diagonal elements, but need not decline 
sequentially; 
and 
aij^a^j^ all i<j Condition 3 
a^j^aj j all Kj. Condition 4 
As we proceed to later cases these conditions will alter, 
^This requires us to assume that under conditions of un­
certainty the preference function has: 
Transitivity: If AIB and BIO then AIC where A, B, 
and C are events and I represents the indifference 
relation. 
Continuity of preference as a function of P: If A is 
preferred to B (footnote continued on following page) 
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outcomes in the matrix, the lender can assign Von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility numbers to them. He must assign numbers 
to outcomes which involve risk, gains, losses, opportunity 
costs, and certainty. These may carry vastly different 
weights: losses may be weighted more heavily than gains, cer­
tain return may be weighted more heavily than uncertain return, 
real costs may be weighted more heavily than opportunity costs. 
Any number of possibilities such as these may be considered; 
the point is that the outcomes may be assigned Von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility numbers. In Figure 2,2 IT^l the utility 
number assigned to outcome an, U32 is the utility number 
assigned to outcome and so on. The utility matrix may 
then be treated as the payoff matrix in a simple game against 
nature. The lender, as a player, is faced with the problem 
of selecting the best path or combinations of paths to travel 
(footnote continued from previous page) and B is pre­
ferred to C there exists a probability number Pg, 
such that 0<Pa<l and BlQ'3^:A,Ôl* 
Independence; For ABCD if AIB and CID then |P;A,0 
I g»:B,:0 for any probability P. 
• For any A and B and probability numbers r and r' if 
A is preferred to B then jjr:A.B| is preferred to 
(r ' :A,0 ; if and only if r>r , 
For any alternatives A and B and probabilities P, 
Pa, and P^: 
[i: » llb*^»|j 
where r is a probability number given by% 
r = PPa + (l-P)Pb. 
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k-1 Oil ^12 h 3  
Possible 
liquidation k U21 U22 U23 
dates 
k+l 
^31 
C\
J 
^33 
k-1 k k+1 
Host profitable path to 
Figure 2.2. Utility matrix 
over the unknown period of time. He must somehow allocate liis 
funds, bearing in mind that whatever path he chooses, he is 
likely to miss his guess and end up with an off-diagonal pay­
off,^ Accordingly, the desirability of each path must be 
weighted by the probability of the obligation being due on the 
date in question. This is essentially what a game does. 
The lender's strategy is thus a choice of path to a due 
date and nature's strategy is the manipulation of the due date. 
We assume that, as previously mentioned, the lender is exper­
ienced enough to attach probabilities to nature's behavior. 
Naturels strategy, when the due date is uncertain, is therefore 
^We would expect that for the typical lender diagonal 
terms"would have higher utility numbers than off-diagonal 
terms. Oeteris parabus. to have one's expectations fulfilled 
is generally ex ante more pleasant than to be surprised and 
receive an off-diagonal payoff. This is also true of the 
later cases. See previous footnote. 
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a mixed oae, but is known to the lender. 
The general case of a two-person, constant-sum game is 
as follows. Each player selects a vector from a set of vectors 
as a strategy. The elements of the set must be vectors satis­
fying the following conditions; 
Each (r=l,2,...m), of vector X, where X = 
X2...Xjjj), must be greater than or equal to zero 
m 
and ^  Xj. = 1. A. pure strategy exists when one Xj. = 
r=l 
1 and all others in the vector equal zero. The 
other player selects a vector I where Y = (%% Y2«"^n) 
and each Yg (8=1,2,...n), is greater than or equal 
n 
to zero and 21 Yg = 1. 
8=1 
If nature's strategy is the vector Y and the 
lender's strategy is the vector X then the expected 
value of the game to the lender is 
m n 
E(X,Y) = 22 T'ïïrcXyYg where Is the 
r=l 8=1 
element in the r^^ row of the payoff matrix. Re­
stated in matrix terms: E(X,Y) = X'UY where X and 
Y are column vectors and U is the payoff matrix. 
Since nature's strategy is known, and since the game is 
played only once, the solution follows easily. The lender 
wants to maximize the expected value of the game; his problem 
! 
is to pick the strategy which does that. Assume he estimates 
that the chance of the obligation coming due in k-1 is .25, 
in k is .50, and in k+1 is .25. Then the investor must pick 
a vector of X's which maximizes the following: 
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Bi %2 *3 Un Ui2 ^13 
U21 U22 ^23 
U51 U32 U33 
Under these conditions, the l^ender's "best strategy is a 
pure one: 
= (c D H 
^11 ^12 ^13 
U21 U22 U23 
U31 U32 U33 
where C = %1%11 4- X2U21 X3U31 
D = X1U12 + X2U22 + X3U32 
E = X1U13 + X2U23 + X3U33 
Since • iB is the value of the game to the lender, the 
problem is to select a strategy which maximizes • JE 
subject to the constraint • X2 + X3 = 1. Assuming that 
%1» ^12» ••••^33 GLi'G greater than zero and unequal, then at 
least one pure strategy is better than any mixed strategy. To 
compare any mixed strategy to any pure strategy we must note 
that elements C, D, and E would, for a pure strategy, be re­
placed by the strategy's corresponding row. That is, for 
pure strategy X^^, 0, D, and E would be replaced by U%2^, U]^2» 
and U23 respectively, or the first row In the payoff matrix, 
Xg as a pure strategy produces the second row in the place of 
C, D, and E and X3 produces the third row. Now for any given 
mixed strategy to be better than all pure strategies C as 
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above must be greater than and or D must be 
greater than U12* ^22' ^32» 2 must be greater than 
^13* ^23' Emd ^33» 1 glance at the figures will assure the 
reader that none of these conditions can be fulfilled; where 
+ ^ 2 * = 1» 0 cannot be greater than each of its ele­
ments, The same reasoning holds for D and £• Only when 
nature's strategy is unknown (which is not the same as assuming 
all states equally likely) can diversification beat a pure 
strategy. A pure strategy is also best in the face of 
equally likely states. 
Once the lender has selected from his set of strategies 
that strategy which maximizes the expected value of the game, 
he has determined his demand for securities of a particular 
maturity. In other words, once a path has been chosen the 
lender will enter the maturity category of the first security 
on the path. For example, a lender might find the probabil­
ity of the obligation coming due in k high enough that he 
would hedge by entering the k maturity market regardless of 
other considerations. It might be the case, however, that 
expectations of rate changes would nevertheless draw him into 
the short market or the long market. Rate changes will then 
affect estimates of profitability on particular paths and 
cause shifting on the demand side. Lenders are therefore now 
responsive both to price changes and to horizon effects. 
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Case 3 
Suppose that the uncertainties are reversed: the lender 
is now certain of the liquidation date, but uncertain of fu­
ture interest rates. He is now faced with estimating the 
return on alternative paths to the known liquidation date. In 
general there will be several paths to the known liquidation 
date, each of which has certain characteristics by which the 
lender ranks it. In other words, the lender has a subjective 
probability distribution of returns for each path to the known 
liquidation date and he must assign Von Neuzann-Morg ens t ern 
utility numbers to these various distributions* Each dis­
tribution has, of course, an expected value and a variance. 
We suspect that the mean and variance would be the major 
decision variables, but this approach also allows consider­
ation of skewness and kurtosls. All of these clearly may be 
relevant to the evaluation of a path. 
These distributions of outcomes for all paths leading 
to the known liquidation date are then compared, and the 
lender simply picks the one with the highest utility number. 
This process can also be seen as a very simple game where 
nature has only one, pure strategy. The payoff matrix has 
only a single non-zero column, and the lender's best strategy 
remains a pure one: 
5*1 xa xg 0 Ui2 0 
0 U22 0 
0 C
\J 
0 
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Again when the path has been selected, the lender's demand 
for securities of a particular maturity is determined. Again 
the lender can, in the face of rate changes, be convinced to 
move from one path to another. For exeunple, changes in ex­
pected interest rates can alter the distribution of returns 
for any path, sind thus alter its assigned utility number. 
The new utility number might lead to a new best path thereby 
altering the lender's demand for a given security.^ 
Oase 4 
The final and most general case is that in which ex­
pectations about both future rates of interest and the liqui­
dation date are not held with certainty. The lender in this 
case is faced with the problem of evaluating the distribution 
of outcomes for each path, and selecting a utility maximizing 
path to an uncertain point in the future. 
The structure of the problem changes little for this 
case; the only difference between this case and Case 5 is 
that nature's mixed strategy is reinstated. As before, the 
lender compares the distribution of outcomes associated with 
each path and assigns Von Neumann-Morg ens tern utility num­
bers to the distributions. The utility numbers of the 
best paths to the several possible liquidation dates be-
^This case is essentially the Malkielian case where 
there is a known horizon but no variance about it. Halklel 
arbitrarily assumes a one year horizon and allows his in­
vestors to move into either the short or long market based 
upon their expectations about rates over the year horizon. 
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come the diagonal elements. Nature again has a strategy 
which we assume the Investor estimates. This strategy may 
cover any number of periods, and, in the case of an ex-
pectations-oriented lender, will probably cover a large num­
ber. 
To continue the 5 by 3 example, assume the lender 
estimates nature's strategy to be P(k-l) = .25, P(k) = .50, 
and P(k+1) = .25. Then the lender must pick the strategy 
which maximizes the expected value of the following game: 
&1 Ï2 ^11 ^12 %3 
U21 U22 U23 
U31 U32 U33 
As before, since nature's strategy is assumed known, the 
lender's best strategy is a pure one. If we eirbltrarlly 
assign utility numbers, then the solution is a choice of pure 
strategies as follows: 
yields Xa Xj] 3 5 7 Ï 
2 6 4 i 
1 8  
0 5 H 4 for pure, or {2 6 ^ Ï  for X2 pure. 
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or {l 8 ^ i for pure, 
i 
j  
Clearly maximizes the value so that the choice made is to 
take the path to k+1. The lender will then demand the first 
security on that path. Obviously, different utility numbers 
would produce different solutions. 
This completes the analysis of the demand side. We 
have modified our pure segmentation approach by allowing 
lenders to be concerned about returns and by allowing them to 
shift maturities on the basis of expected returns. We have 
assumed that the lender's preferences can be represented by a 
Von Ne umann-Morg en s t ern utility function, and we have intro­
duced an expected horizon. This approach accommodates a very 
wide range of lenders from those who are purely expectations-
oriented to those who are purely segmentation-oriented. Those 
lenders who are pure speculators will have a very broad horizon 
and may regard all possible due dates in that horizon as 
equally likely. Segmentation-oriented lenders such as insti­
tutional lenders may have a well-defined obligation structure, 
in which case the horizon is likely to be a very narrow one 
with a particularly large probability placed upon one due date. 
Rigidity is thereby introduced, since it may take a large 
spread between rates to draw the lender out of a nearly cer­
tain haven. 
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At any time, the market could be comprised of any com­
bination of these lenders. The sensitivity of the demand 
side to external forces would then depend upon that compo­
sition, It thus becomes an empirical question whether there 
are enough lenders with a strong maturity preference to make 
debt swaps effective in altering the yield structure. 
II 
In order to have a clearly-determined rate structure, 
it is necessary to examine the supply side of the market as 
well as the demand side. The same considerations which moti­
vated the modification of the demand side also motivate the 
modifications to the supply side. We assume suppliers to be 
motivated to minimize risk, but to have some trade-off be­
tween risk and profit (in the form of cost reduction). 
Much the same uncertainties beset the borrower as beset 
the lender. Borrowers have need of funds for a period of 
time, and there are penalties for arranging to have funds for 
too short or too long a time. Presumably a borrower issues 
debt in order to undertake a project which will in time ex­
hibit positive net productivity. If the funds are borrowed 
for a time short of the mark, the borrower must refinance for 
the remainder of the chosen period. If he borrows for too 
long a period, he must either pay additional interest or 
redeem the debt at possibly unfavorable prices. In either 
case the cost of missing the point on the horizon may be 
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significant. The borrower is thus motivated to stay near the 
maximum probability point on his horizon. We assume, however, 
that the borrower is familiar enough with his operation to 
estimate the horizon by assigning probabilities to the event 
happening in each of the horizon periods. This in our estab­
lished structure, becomes nature's strategy. 
The other source of uncertainty can equally be intro­
duced to the borrower's side. Since we assume the borrower 
has a trade-off between yield and risk he formulates expec­
tations about future rates of interest. These expectations 
can cause the borrower to shift positions within his horizon. 
Particular expectations may well cause him to finance short 
of the most likely due date in the horizon because he expects 
to be able to reduce cost by refinancing in the latter periods. 
The same sort of considerations may draw him beyond the most 
probable date on the horizon. The borrower is thus beset by 
the same uncertainties as the lender and must, therefore, 
carry out the same sort of decision process. 
As in the previous analysis the borrower is assumed to 
be able to assign Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility numbers to 
the list of outcomes for each of the paths to the various 
points on the horizon. The paths with the highest utility 
numbers become the diagonal elements in the payoff matrix. 
Nature's strategy is estimated by the borrower, and the game 
is played. As with the lender, it is to the borrower's ad­
vantage to play a pure strategy when nature's strategy is 
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known. Thus the borrower must maximize 
where the Z's are the borrower's strategies, the 7's are 
utility numbers and l/2, 1/3» 1/6 is the borrower's estimate 
of nature's strategy. 
Once the game is played and a path selected, the supply 
of securities in each maturity is determined. Changes in 
rates alter yield and risk elements in the distributions of 
outcomes. These changes then cause changes in the payoff 
matrix which in turn causes suppliers to shift maturities. 
Maturity shifts by suppliers consequently cause shifts in the 
rate pattern. 
Ill 
Now that we have introduced yield concern and uncertain­
ty to both supply and demand sides, we must examine the re­
sulting term structure of rates. These modifications are 
sufficient to allow ap explanation of observed yield curves. 
Further, our results are consistent with at least three of 
the recognized theories of the term structure.^ An example 
with satisfactory detail would be tedious. In order to in-
^Malkiel (53), Modigliani and Sutch (60) (61), and to 
some extent Lutz (51) arrive at essentially the same con­
clusions. 
1—
1 \
>
 CM 
^13 1/2 
V21 V22 ^23 1/3 
V31 V32 V33 1/6 
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dicate the general workings of the model we will present 
three simple examples from which the mechanism can "be 
grasped. 
Example 1 
Imagine a debt market which is in an equilibrium such 
that the yield curve is level throughout. Suppose further 
that all participants expect rates to remain unchanged to the 
end of their horizons. This assumption allows us to isolate 
the effect produced by the existence of horizons. Let us 
further assume that all horizons on both sides of the market 
are identical distributions as pictured in Figure 2,3. We 
[1/3 1/3 1/3] 
Lenders Ql/3 1/3 i/â 
Cl/3 1/3 l/3j 
[1/3 1/3 1/3] 
Borrowers [l/3 1/3 1/3] 
[1/3 1/3 l/3j 
k-1 k k+l 
Figure 2,3, Example 1 horizons 
assume that the 6 participants bargain for a period of time 
and at the end of that period, contracts are settled and 
securities are issued. When the bargaining period opens, in 
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this example, each borrower or lender finds that his counter­
parts are as indifferent to maturity as he is; no period on 
any horizon presents special due date attraction, nor is any 
maturity particularly advantageous because of expected rate 
changes. If we disregard factors other than rate expecta­
tions and horizons, the yield curve will emerge from the bsur-
gaining period unchanged. Any tendency for it to take a shape 
other than level will be arbitraged away. 
Example 2 
Let us now start as in Example 1 but introduce the hor­
izon changes displayed in figure 2,4. Now, even though rates 
[1/2 1/3 1/g 
Lenders [l/2 1/4 1/4| 
[5/8 1/4 1/g 
[l/6 1/3 l/fi 
Borrowers (l/4 1/4 i/d 
S/8 3/8 i/U 
k-1 k k+l 
figure 2.4. Example 2 horizons 
are expected to remain unchanged, maturity is to no partici­
pant a matter of indifference. Lenders will gather at k-1 
because: (1) that is the most likely due date; and (2) the 
no-rate-change expectation may not "be held with certainty so 
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the path to k-1 minimizes risk. The same considerations 
motivate borrowers to gather at k+1. When bargaining opens, 
borrowers will have to induce lenders to move to k and k+1 
by offering higher rates than the current equilibrium ones. 
Any lender who wishes to stay in k-1 will have to accept 
lower rates. By successive iterations of bargaining and re-
estimations some lenders will be drawn to k and k+1 and some 
borrowers will be drawn to k and k-1. The equilibrium yield 
curve thus obtained will be an ascending one and the rise will 
have been produced solely by the existence of horizons since the 
expectations effects produce only a level curve. 
Example 3 
In this example we will use exactly the conditions which 
prevailed at the beginning of Example 2 with the single ex­
ception that all participants expect rates to rise to the end 
of their horizons. Lenders will again gather at k-1 because* 
(1) that is the most likely due date; and (2) shorter-term 
bond prices fall least for a given increase in rates^ so that 
taking the path to k-1 also minimizes risk. Also, by engaging 
in short contracts the lender can continually reinvest at even 
higher rates. Borrowers will gather at k+1 because: (1) that 
Is the most likely due date; and (2) since rates are expected 
^We draw here upon the mathematics of bond price move­
ments so clearly presented by Malkiel ( 5 3 ) .  
P 
This disregards any transactions costs. 
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to rise, borrowers can finance themselves now more cheaply 
than at any time in the future. It is therefore to the bor­
rowers* advantage to borrow long-term now rather than risk 
having to refinance for a few periods at the future's higher 
rates. 
As the bargaining proceeds, borrowers will find they 
must induce lenders into k and k+1 by offering higher rates 
than the current equilibrium rates. But now these higher rates 
must be high enough to overcome the effect of horizons arid 
expectations as well. The result is that the yield curve will 
ascend more sharply than in Example 2. It will also ascend 
more sharply than in the case of pure expectations. 
Had we used this same Example 3 but with rates expected 
to fall, rather than reinforcing one another, the horizon 
effect and expectations would exert opposite influences on the 
curve. Which cf the two forces would dominate would depend on 
the strength of expectations and the horizon compositions. 
But whichever force dominated, the yield curve would be less 
steep than if the two were mutually reinforcing. 
It is interesting to compare the implications of these 
examples, the Hicksian "constitutional weakness* argument, and 
observed yield curves. The constitutional weakness hypothesis 
argues that the prevailing horizon of lenders is shorter than 
that of borrowers (see Example 2), The result of this hor­
izon disparity is that borrowers will consistently bid long-
term rates above short-term rates. If, therefore, rates are 
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expected to rise, the yield curve will rise; if rates are 
expected to remain unchanged, the yield curve will rise; the 
yield curve can descend only if rates are expected to fall 
enough to offset the constitutional weakness. Since in two 
of three possible rate expectations cases the yield will rise, 
we would expect rising curves over time to dominate the yield 
structure. This observation assumes that all cases of rate 
expectation are equally likely. Observed yield structures 
over the last 40 years have been predominantly rising. The 
descending curves are concentrated mostly in the '30's. Ob­
served yield structures are then consistent with the Hlckslan 
constitutional weakness argument. These observations can, of 
course, also be accommodated by our model. 
We could continue these examples by Introducing different 
length horizons and various rate expectations, but they would 
simply be matters of going through the mechanism. These ex­
amples are sufficient to clearly establish the effect of a 
horizon. 
We have thus introduced modifications which allow us to 
explain the observed yield structures. The major point to be 
gained from this exercise is that the yield structure is not 
completely at the mercy of any single determinant; it reflects 
the presence of expectations, uncertainty, and maturity pref­
erence. Our approach allows expectations and horizon effects 
to operate on all participants. In this manner we are able to 
explain the yield structure while remaining consistent with 
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other models. The major Interest of this approach is the al­
lowance of a specific time horizon which is an integral part 
of the decision-making process and need not be arbitrarily 
specified by the investigator. Combined with expectations, 
the horizon helps to explain behavior of participants on both 
sides of the market. Just what combination of horizon pref­
erence and expectations actually exists is a matter for 
empirical Investigation, 
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STATISTICAL REVIEW 
I 
In order to get a feel for testing procedures in this 
chapter we will review some of the statistical tests of term 
structure theory. There have been a number of tests of the 
expectations hypothesis, most of which put major emphasis on 
expectations and mention liquidity premia and other such seg­
mentation considerations only residually. We will not try to 
review all contributors since there is much near-duplication. 
We will instead cover only the more prominent tests which 
have shown support for each of the two hypotheses. 
Testing hypotheses about the term structure of interest 
rates involveo a particularly tricky and intriguing problem. 
Indeed, the numerous tests which have been conducted have had 
to face the following problem: to test the expectations 
hypothesis one is put in the difficult position of having 
to discover ex ante expectations using ex post observations. 
One must look at data from the past and somehow explain what 
expectations must have been and how they made the yield struc­
ture what It was. For a long time this problem made term 
structure tests scarce. 
The current debate over term structure hypotheses was 
largely limited to theoretical inquiry until the work of 
Melselman (57), Melselman was the first to produce anything 
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like an operational test of the expectations hypothesis. 
Lutz (51) and Culbertson (23) both had tests before this, 
but they are mostly casual observations about yield structures 
which could hardly be called statistical analysis. 
Meiselman's approach is to argue that if the market 
operated according to expectations; 
"If actual rates are higher than had been an­
ticipated, the market may systematically revise 
upward expectations of what short-term rates in 
the future are likely to be. Similarly, if actual 
rates are lower than had been anticipated, then 
the market may also systematically revise down­
ward expectations of future short-term rates." 
(57, p. 20) 
He then argues that forward or expected short rates change on 
the basis of past forecasting errors. 
Recall that under the expectations hypothesis, the ex­
pected future short-term rates are implicit in the yield curve. 
Since long rates are only the geometric mean of expected fu­
ture short rates, the ratio of any adjacent long rates is the 
expected future short rate between the two long rates: 
- 1. 
Meiselman's hypothesis is that the change in this expected 
future short rate is a function of the forecasting error for 
the current period's short rate. The hypothesis is expressed 
^ or that 
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~ 8(2%) where B% is the forecasting error. By 
assuming the relationship to be linear it can be expressed as 
^t+n^l " a+bE%. This error-learning model produced the 
t 
first operational test for the presence of expectations. 
Since forward rates of interest can be implied from the 
structure of rates at any point in time, Meiselman tested his 
model using the changes in implied forward rate from one to 
eight years in the future. His data were taken from Durand^ 
and cover the period 1901-1954. Table 3.1 gives Meiselman's 
results. The results may be summarized as follows: the re­
gression coefficients are all positive and significant and 
fall with the rise in maturity; the correlation coefficients 
fall with the rise in maturity; and none of the constemt terms 
is significantly different from zero (57, p. 22). These re­
sults are reasonably clear and may be interpreted in the fol­
lowing manner. The higher correlation coefficients indicate 
that the data are consistent with an expectations-error-
learning mechanism? Much of the change in forward rates is 
explained by this model. Both the regression coefficients 
and the correlation coefflcints decline the farther into the 
future are the forward rates. This seems reasonable on the 
grounds that near-term expectations are generally more firmly 
^In this and subsequent publications Durand figured a 
yearly yield curve for corporate debt (25). 
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Table 3.1. Melselman's results 
n Constant term 
(Standard error) 
Regression 
coefficient 
1 .00 
(.02) 
.703 .952 
2 .00 
(.03) 
.526 .867 
3 -.01 
(.04) 
.403 .768 
4 -.03 
(.04) 
.326 .682 
5 
o
 o
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.277 .642 
6 -.01 
(.03) 
.233 .625 
7 -.02 
(.03) 
.239 .631 
8 .01 
(.03) 
.280 .590 
formed and likely to be more sensitive to the immediate past 
than long-term expectations. Finally, Meiselman contends 
that an intercept term not significantly different from zero 
implies that when expectations have proved correct, there is 
no revision in the forward rate. The Hicksian liquidity 
premium argument implies that maturities farther out on the 
yield curve should carry greater liquidity premia thus forward 
rates should constantly be revised upward. If the Hicksian 
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argument were correct should be a function not 
only of the error term, but should exhibit a liquidity pre­
mium over and above any revision due to forecasting error. 
Since Hicks argues a constitutional weakness In the market 
gives rise to these liquidity premla, they should exist for 
all rates except the current short rate, and should rise aa n 
rises. We would expect the rising liquidity premium to show 
up in a constant term which rises with the n of the future 
short-term rate. Meiselman argues that a statistically in­
significant intercept term does not support this contention. 
It rather indicates that, "...the risk premium on default-
free claims Is zero." (57, p. 46) 
This brief review does Keiselman's work injustice, but 
It draws out the two major conclusions:^ the expectations 
hypothesis via error-learning Is supported by the data, and 
there appears to be no support for the Hicksian liquidity 
premium. This work quickly became the focal point for a 
number of studies which we review. The remaining tests have 
stemmed, in one sense or another, from Meiselman, and these 
tests produce critics as well as supporters. 
^Meiselman also tests the hedging pressure hypothesis 
and finds some support for this approach. He then argues that 
while there may be investors who are committed to a very nar­
row range, it is the marginal shifting in these overlapping 
ranges which allows the expectations hypothesis to hold. 
This observation is perfectly consistent with the theory de­
veloped in the preceedlng chapter. 
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One of the first responses was that of Wood (108) (109), 
who generally agrees with Melselman but observes that 
Melselman's conclusion that a zero Intercept term is incon­
sistent with liquidity premia is in error.^ Paraphrasing from 
Wood, we can express the Hicksian liquidity premium model in 
the context of Melselman as follows: 
t+n^i^ - t+n^lt-i ~ ^ * b(Blt ' 
where . P, is the Hicks-Meiselman forward rate combination 
t+n 
such that, t+n^lt = * t+n^^* ^ here is the 
liquidity premium. Substituting liquidity premia and ex­
pected rates for forward rates. 
Rearranging, 
(t+nrit"t+nrit_i)+(t+alït"t+n^lt_i) = 
Melselman distinguishes the expectations hypothesis from 
the liquidity premia hypothesis on the assumption that a 
zero forecasting error implies a zero forward rate revision. 
Allowing both to be zero in the above equation produces the 
following: t+n^^t't+n^^ ~ a-bf^Li^^ ^ ). Melselman's hy­
pothesis that a zero intercept term is inconsistent with 
liquidity premia can be examined by introducing a zero inter-
^Kessel (43) arrives independently at the same conclusion. 
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cept and seeing if the results are inconsistent with, the 
existence of liquidity premia. When the intercept is zero, 
t+n^lt-t+n^t-l ~ t+n^lt* t+n^lt-l' 
are the liquidity premiums for n, n+1, and 1 periods 
it —1 
in the future. If Hicks' hypothesis is correct then the li­
quidity premia should rise with maturity so that, 
t+n^lt"t+n^lt ^ 0. This condition is perfectly consistent 
with the above. Since both b and are positive it 
t—1 
follows that <S>, A zero constant term is thus 
perfectly consistent with liquidity premia (108). Some doubt 
has been cast upon the strength and direction of Meiselman's 
conclusions. 
Further criticism and modification were not long in 
coming. Much of the effort is focused on the most obvious 
shortcoming of Meiselman's test, the data. Criticisms of the 
data used however, apply no more to Meiselman than to other 
investigators who use data derived from yield curves, 
Durand's data (25) (26) (27) has some shortcomings, 
considering the fine conclusions Meiselman draws from it. 
Durand's data is a series of "basic" yields of corporate 
bonds, for each of the over fifty bonds used in computing 
each year's curve the following six prices were obtained: 
the high and low selling price in each of the first three 
months of the year. These quotes were then averaged and 
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rounded to the nearest twentieth of one percent (25, p. 8). 
Yield curves were drawn in free-hand, but limited to four 
types: (1) monotonically decreasing at a decreasing rate, 
becoming horizontal at the end; (2) monotonically rising, be­
coming horizontal at the end; (3) rising in early stages then 
taking the shape of (1); and a horizontal line (25, p. 9). 
This is clearly a great deal of adjusting, and Grant (36) 
points out that, 
"Durand was attempting not to fit to ob­
served bond yields but to devise a simplified 
yield concept, a 'basic yield' at which a hy­
pothetical corporate security of the highest 
possible standing could be traded. Because 
of this simplification all anomalies in the 
actual yield-maturity relationship were re­
moved," (36, p. 60) 
Grant further points out that Durand himself, in the 1958 
Journal of Finance article, said his curves were not appro­
priate for the derivation of implied forward rates from them. 
They are so rude a measure and the equation 
1 • r, = (l+t&n+l)^*^ 
tfn It ' 
(l+t%n)* 
is so sensitive to error, that the results are unreliable 
(36, p. 61), 
The difficulty here is that yield curves as such do not 
exist, A yield curve implies at least one security coming 
due in each of the next n periods and, if there is more than 
one security maturing in a period, all must trade at the same 
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price. Were this the case we could interpolate "between ob­
served maturity dates fairly confidently. Figure 3.1 on the 
following page indicates this. The upper panel shows a yield 
curve derived under ideal conditions. All securities of a 
given maturity carry the same price and the relationship be­
tween maturity and yield seems reasonably clear. The lower 
panel represents a yield curve derived from raw data which 
generally come in the following form. Maturities are dis-
continuously distributed over the range; there are gaps and 
congregations. Moreover, due to such characteristics as tax 
status, call features, issuer reputation, etc., bonds of like 
maturity generally do not trade at the same price. In an 
effort to expose the relationships among what would exist if 
all securities had the same features and were continuously 
distributed over the maturity range, a smoothing and inter­
polation technique is undertaken. The results are shown in 
the lower panel in Figure 3.2, A curve which appears to sum­
marize the relationship is drawn on the raw data, but it is 
not immediately clear what amount of this smoothing and inter­
polation actually lays bare the relationship which would exist 
if securities were homogeneous and evenly distributed on the 
maturity range; nor for that matter is it clear what rela­
tionship actually exists in the minds of investors. It also 
is not clear what sort of averaging should be used for indi­
vidual price observations. Dally averages, monthly averages. 
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Term to maturity 
Figure 5.1. Ideal yield curve 
Terra to maturity 
Figure 5.2. Actual yield curve 
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and quarterly averages would all give rise to different yield 
curves. The true relationship among maturities is not a 
settled matter. 
The investigators under review generally criticize 
Meiselman for his data use. Each then inserts his own set 
of data with its own particular biases and tests that data. 
Grant (36) was one of the first to criticize Meiselman and 
substitute his own data. 
He constructed a set of yield curves from British data 
which were gathered in fundamentally the same fashion as the 
Durand data, the major difference between the two being the 
smoothing technique between actual observations, Durand con­
tinuously smoothed the data until relatively constant dif­
ferences were obtained. Grant interpolated linearly in the 
following fashion. Suppose there exists a ten year security 
yielding five per cent and an llj year bond yielding per 
cent with no bonds maturing between ten and 11^ years. The 
yield for a hypothetical 11 year bond would be calculated as 
an average of the two observed yields, weighted inversely 
by the term between hypothetical and observed maturities. In 
this case the result would be 6 per cent (36, p. 60). 
Grant then tested Meiselman's model and got signifi­
cantly poorer results: the correlation coefficients were 
low, ranging from 0,43 to 0.64; the sign of the forecasting 
error was not well-synchronized with the sign of the forward 
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rate changes; and the constant terms showed no regularity 
(36, p. 62). As an addition to the Meiselman model Grant 
appended cubic and quadratic terms. The results were even 
poorer than before, but did not contradict Meiselman's re­
sults. Grant concluded, "There is clearly a relationship to 
be found in the data, and it is possible that hypothetical 
yield curves, constructed under different assumptions would 
have exhibited a stronger relationship." (36, p. 63) 
Van Home (99) carried out the same sort of test as 
Grant. Van Home used data from the U.S. Treasury Bulletins 
rather than Durand data. In each month's Treasury Bulletin 
is published a free-hand drawn yield curve whose observations 
are over-the-counter closing quotations on U.S. Government 
bonds for the last day of the month in the Kew York Market. 
Van Home tested Meiselman's model on this data and got 
slightly better results in that the correlation coefficients 
ran consistently higher than Meiselman's (99» p. 346). More 
important to Van Home's approach, the constant terms are 
everywhere significantly different from zero, implying (con­
trary to Meiselman's conclusions) that the data are consistent 
with an upward revision of the forward rate even when there 
is no forecasting error. 
This observation leads Van Home to a further test. If 
risk is inversely related to the actual rate level, then the 
residuals from the Meiselman model should exhibit a particular 
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pattern. When forward rates are low compared to the usual 
range, residuals should be positive, and when forward rates 
are comparatively high, the residuals should be negative 
(99» p. 347). Van Home then fits the equation 
Where b2 is deviation of actual rates from a historically 
established normal level (99» p. 349). The addition of the 
risk variable, bg, added little to Meiselman's results for 
shorter maturities, but raised the correlation coefficients 
significantly for longer maturities. The bg coefficients were 
statistically significant and increased with the variable 
maturity, suggesting, "...increasing importance of interest-
rate risk as maturity increases," (99, p. 350) Again 
Meiselman's results are put into doubt; Van Home finds evi­
dence of liquidity premia where Meiselman did not. 
Probably the most telling criticisms of Meiselman came 
from Buse (16) (17) (18), Buse (17) makes an independent 
test of the Meiselman model using British data (not Grant's) 
and then examines the effect of the data form for Grant's, 
Van Home's, and Meiselman's tests. The results are most 
interesting and relevant. 
After first demonstrating that liquidity premia can be 
generated in a Meiselman-type model independently of the 
value of the constant term, Buse then points out that li­
quidity premium investigation should not be limited to Hicks-
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Keynes "backwardation" (17, p. 53). As Samuelson has pointed 
o u t :  " a s  a  c l o s e  r e a d i n g  o f  t h e  l i t e r e a t u r e  w i l l  s h o w ,  
liquidity-preference analysis becomes more general and admits 
of a wider variety of empirical patterns....Hence, a priori 
reasoning cannot itself settle what are the most plausable 
patterns to look for..."^ 
Buse next turns to the major concern of the paper, the 
relation of forward rates to the yield curve. Buse writes: 
"For any given yield curve there is a set of 
associated forward rates which can be graphed 
in conjunction with that yield curve. The 
dependent variable of the Meiselman model, 
t+n^t " t+n^t-i* 
is the difference between two such sets of for­
ward rates, one of which has been moved one 
time unit along the horizontal axis of the 
yield-time coordinates. In order for this 
difference to decline systematically, given 
the error of prediction, the yield curve 
must conform to a particular pattern. Not 
surprisingly this pattern turns out to be a 
relatively smooth yield curve." (17, p. 54) 
The implication is that Meiselman's results depend upon the 
smoothing and interpolation techniques used on the data. 
The above allegation is supported by letting 
d = Rh-Rq.! and substituting this into, 
1 + r* = . 
(l+Ba-l)*-! 
where is the current n year rate, is the current 
^P.A, Samuelson, Directors Comment in Kessel (43, p. 101), 
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n-1 year rate, and r^ is the short rate expected to prevail 
in year n. After the substitution, solving for r^ by means 
of expanding the terms on the right gives simplified approx­
imations for r^ which are much easier to use. Solving 
produces R^.^+nd and r^ = Rg4^n-l)d where n as a 
subscript indicates the same number of years as when used as 
a coefficient. These equations, while only near approxi­
mations show that a positively sloped yield curve has for­
ward rates above it and vise versa for a negatively sloped 
curve (17, p. 55). Buse then argues that r^ depends not 
only on the two adjacent maturities used, but on the level 
and slope of the curve as well. Obviously a smooth, monotonie 
curve generates a set of forward rates with a smaller range of 
fluctuation than would a non-nonotonic curve (17, p. 55)* 
Buse then concludes that Grant's use of linear interpolation 
in the data caused an erratic forward rate series which In 
turn caused Grant's poor results (17, p. 58).^ 
Continuing, Buse notes that whether forward rates rise 
or fall depends upon the rate of change of the slope of the 
yield curve. Since, as we have seen, r^^ is partly a function 
of the difference, dQ_^-dQ, and this difference is changing in 
a smooth yield curve, forward rates will also change system-
^Buse also graphs the forward rate series for Grant, 
Buse, and Meiselman data. This test shows what was suspected, 
that Grant's series is very erratic while Buse's and 
Meiselman's are smooth. 
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atically. Smoothed yield curves with diminishing slope pro­
duce forward rate curves with the same characteristics (17» 
p. 56)• 
Buse graphs the forward rates from British data, both 
smoothed and linearly interpolated, and concludes that the 
difference is "nothing less than spectacular" (17, p. 56). 
It is clear that the decline in Meiselman's regression coef­
ficients and correlation coefficients in longer maturities 
depends upon the smooth shape of the yield curve. 
To further establish this point, Buse questions whether 
Meiselman's results really indicate that the market is dom­
inated by expectations-oriented participants. Could the same 
results arise from any historical yield curves whose variance 
diminishes with maturity? Tc test the point he randomly 
orders both the Durand data and his British data and retests 
Meiselman's model. The results, averaged over four random 
orderlngs of the yield curves for each set of data, have, 
"...all the characteristics associated with previous tests 
of the Meiselman model..." (17, p. 60), A further test was 
carried out by reversing the chronological order of the yield 
curves — putting the last year first, etc., — amd retesting 
Meiselman's model. The results again are not significantly 
different from Meiselman's original test results. 
In summary, Buse concludes:' 
"The Meiselman model is consistent with any set 
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of smoothed yield curves in which the short 
and long rates move together "but in which 
short rates show greater variability. The 
correct chronological order is not vital to 
the result. The model cannot, therefore, 
be considered a useful test of the expecta­
tions theory because it does not discriminate 
between the behavior of investors acting on 
Meiselman postulates and alternative formu­
lations which are consistent with the same 
pattern of observed rates." (17, p. 61) 
What started out as a reasonably strong test of the 
expectations hypothesis has thus been weakened. The funda­
mental question at issue is the shape of the yield curve. 
If there is a yield curve, what shape Is it? Do investors 
mentally smooth it? Do they interpolate linearly? Buse's 
criticisms are well-taken, but leave the issue open,^ 
An alternative test of the expectations theory (and 
also of the segmentation theory) has been carried out by 
Michaelson (58), This study is not of major importance, but 
indicates another approach to the testing problem, Michaelson 
tests three hypotheses about the term structure: "(1) Realized 
yields closely approximate anticipated yields; (2) when (1) 
does not hold, realized yields primarily reflect changes in 
expectaions; (3) realized yields primarily reflect shifts in 
non-expectational factors," (58, p, 449) The first hypoth­
is expressed as • 2.^ where is realized 
^Buse (16) (18) applies this same approach to other 
studies. We have reviewed this one as it is the most 
relevant to our inquiry. 
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holding period yield,is anticipated yield, and 
is a random error component which, in large samples, should 
average out to zero. Assuming the expectations hypothesis 
holds, the existence of liquidity premia can be tested by 
comparing means of interest rate series having different 
terms to maturity. On the assumption that the expectations 
hypothesis holds, anticipated yields can be inferred from 
the term structure. Yield series with different terms to 
maturity give average anticipated yields. Michaelson then 
argues that if these series means rise as maturity rises, this 
is evidence of risk premia. If the series are constant then 
this does not support liquidity premia (58, p. 449). 
The second hypothesis is stated Tnt = ^ ?nt where ^ 
is the price change resulting from changes in expected short-
term rates during the period. If the expectations hypothesis 
holds, so that expected short rates are highly correlated, 
then the windfall gains and losses should be larger the longer 
the term to maturity. Under this hypothesis realized yields 
will be mostly composed of ^ components and the standard 
deviations of the realized yield series should be positively 
correlated with their terms to maturity. Also these series 
should be positively intercorrelated, with the highest cor­
relation being between series closest in term to maturity, be­
cause adjacent series share the largest number of windfall 
terms. These windfall terms should not be systematically 
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related so the series should "be serially Independent (58, 
p. 451). 
These hypotheses were tested using holding period data 
on governments. Realized holding periods were calculated as, 
( ^t+l^^t ) ïn» = 1" 
Where is the realized yield over the t^^ week on an n 
week security, and ^ are prices at the beginning 
and end of the week and C_ is the week's coupon payment, 
Michaelson used a 13 week bill series, a 2.5, 5» 7.5» and 10 
year bond series, and an average of each. 
In general the data support the hypotheses advanced, 
but not much weight can be attached to the conclusions since 
the major part of the hypothesis had to be assumed to get the 
data. The bill-yield series rises with term to maturity, 
implying the existence of liquidity premia. The second hy­
pothesis tested gives less clear results. While there is 
much intercorrelation between series (as expected) there is 
a positive serial correlation in the bill series (which was 
not expected) indicating a lack of speculative activity. 
Michaelson's approach also seems questionable to this writer 
on the grounds that the holding periods realized are realized 
only on paper. If Investors actually tried to obtain these 
yields by liquidation, the analysis would be somewhat differ­
ent. At best a few speculators could realize anticipated 
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yields, but the general market could not. We also suspect 
that Michaelson's conclusions are partly a function of the 
characteristics of yield curves discussed by Buse (17). 
This review is sufficient to familiarize us with the 
tests of the expectations hypothesis. Having reached the 
end of this section it is apparent how difficult it is to 
justify the data. . The problem of implying the existence of 
ex ante expectations from ex post data is a tricky one. The 
segmentation hypothesis, while having the same sort of data 
problems, is at least free from trying ex post to imply the 
existence of expectations, We turn now to a few tests of the 
segmentation hypothesis. 
II 
The usual procedure for segmentation hypothesis tests 
is to examine the data for effects of changes in the supply 
of various maturity securities. The segmentation hypothesis 
implies that the teria structure is determined by the supply 
of and demand for securities in each of several market seg­
ments. Assuming demand conditions do not change, it should 
be the case that changes in supplies of securities change 
security prices; thus the term structure should show a 
sensitivity to the supply of securities and to changes 
therein. 
Okun (84) tested for the presence and significance of 
supply effects and in general found less than encouraging 
77 
results. Basically Okun fit two equations, which may be 
summarized as follows: 
r = bo + b]^S + bgL + b^A • b^X 
and 
b = bg + b%8 + bgL + b^X. 
The first equation explains the long-term rate (an average 
rate on bonds due or callable after 12 years) using as in­
dependent variables S, the supply of securities due in less 
than five years; L, the supply due in five or more years; and 
A, the average maturity of securities in L, X is a vector of 
such things as money supply and income. The bill rate equa­
tion (the second one) uses the same independent variables, 
but has no average maturity measure. 
The results, using quarterly data for 1946-1959, are 
summarized in Table 3-2 (84), 
Table 3.2, Okun's results 
S L A 
,0219 .0197 .0046 .935 
(.0042)* (,0029) (.0023) 
,0576 ,0410 ,899 
(.0074) (,0068) 
Standard errors. 
Several additional Income and potential income variables were 
added, but none proved significant. First differences in S 
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and L were also fit, but proved insignificant. 
As expected the coefficients of the debt variables are 
positive; a rise in the outstanding supply now increases the 
interest rate. The coefficient of S in the long rate equa­
tion is larger than that of L implying that an increase in 
the supply of short-term debt would raise the long rate by 
more than an increase in the supply of long-term debt. How­
ever, the difference between them is not statistically sig­
nificant (84, p. 349). 
Okun'& results are not particularly strong, and as he 
points out, they might have been improved by a more sensitive 
average maturity measure (84, p. 349). The debt coefficients, 
while significant, are rather small and it is estimated that a 
simultaneous retirement of one billion in bills and an issue 
of one billion of 20-year bonds would increase the rate spread 
by less than 3 basis points, where a basis point is a hun­
dredth of one per cent (0,01 per cent) (84, p. 357). Okun's 
conclusion is that, "...the long rate is relatively insensi­
tive to changes in the maturity composition of the public 
debt." (84, p. 349) 
Scott ( 9 0 )  has carried out the same sort of test as 
Okun but obtained better results, Scott is also critical of 
Okun's maturity variable. Okun included only the average 
maturity of securities coming due in five or more years. 
Scott argues that this Ignores the effect pf average maturity 
in the shorter class and that, combining very short-term debt 
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(Treasury bills, and securities maturing in less than one 
year) with all debt due in less than five years may have 
covered up liquidity effects associated with very short-term 
debt (90, p. 139). 
Scott then fits various equations which, with the re­
sults, are summarized in Table 3.3 (90). As can be seen from 
the Table, the average maturity variable adds significantly 
to the results, and all the significant variables have the 
expected sign. The data cover the period 1952-1959 by monthly 
observations and so are not directly comparable to Okun's. It 
should also be noted that the average maturity variable shows 
a decrease in the long rate from an increase in debt maturity 
which means, as Malkiel points out, that the rate spread is 
increased by less than the decrease in the short rate (55» 
p. 228). This result Is unexpected but does not Invalidate 
Scott's work. 
Scott's conclusion Is that the long and short rates are 
sensitive to the average maturity of the debt so that in­
creasing the average maturity of the debt by one month pro­
duces a reduction in the rate spread of 5.6 basis points (90, 
p. 137). These results are stronger than those of Okun but, 
as noted, not directly comparable because of different data 
spans. Scott's tests are more inclusive than Okun's in that 
many more relevant independent variables are used and the 
average maturity term is more Inclusive. Also changes in 
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Table 3.3 Scott's results 
to T® Af R2 
R| = 10.48 + #020 + *000 — 
(11.55)b(.943) 
.160 - .113 + .031 
(.438) ( 639) (2.25) 
.7935 
to
 11 9.42 • *017 + .000 — 
(10.28) (.445) 
.081 - .134 + .018 -
(2.17) (8.04) (1.39) 
.056 
(4.54) 
.8305 
4 = 7.50 • .005 + .000 -
(6.03) (.407) 
.086 + .016 + .009 
(4.90) (1.91) (1.31) 
.8430 
= 7.11 + .004 + .000 -
(4.82) (.006) 
.057 + .008 • .004 -
(3.03) (1.01) (.599) 
.021 
(3.34) 
.8589 
II 2.97 — .015 — .000 4 
(11.83) (1.01) 
.074 + .129 - .022 
(2.80) (10.13)(2.25) 
.7440 
Rjj = -2.31 — .013 — .000 4 
(10.59) (.573) 
> .024 4 .142 - .014 4 
(.871) (11.53)(1.48) 
• .035 
(3.85) 
.7781 
^Debits to demand deposits, 
^Change in borrowed reserve position of member banks, 
^Money supply, 
d^ime deposits* 
®U.S. Governments held by non-bank public. 
f 
Average maturity of debt# 
®Bill rate» 
^t values. 
^Bond rate, average of over 10 years maturity, 
3 
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Scott's maturity variable produce 5.6 basis point rate changes 
while Okun's similar measure produces only a 3 basis point 
change. 
Ill 
One of the more recent and sophisticated tests of the 
expectations hypothesis is that of Modigliani and Sutch (here­
after referred to as M&S) (60) (61). We will pay particular 
attention to the technique involved here, as the statistical 
tests in the next chapter adopt this procedure. M&S fit 
essentially the same model in the two different instances 
cited, and we shall, in what follows, draw from both papers. 
Their original study begins by advancing a loosely-
hypothesized theory of the term structure, which they call 
the "preferred habitat" theory (61, p. 183). This theory, 
they argue, blends the expectations theory with elements of 
the segmentation theory, which is the same sort of under­
taking we have tried to advance. The theory begins by 
positing, as does Lutz, that the safest position for an in­
vestor is a maturity "habitat" which matches security matur­
ity to the period of time for which the investor expects to 
be in the market. Once in the habitat the investor must be 
offered some risk premium if he is to be drawn out of this 
habitat. M&S's model therefore implies that any current n 
year rate is composed of two elements: (1) a pure expecta­
tions component; and (2) a positive or negative risk premium 
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reflecting the difference "between the supply of and demand 
for n period loans at the current rate (61, p. 184). 
Putting it another way, the habitat model implies that 
the rate spread, S(n,t), between the long rate, R(n,t), and 
the short rate, R(l,t), depends mostly on the expected chsmge 
in the long rate AR®(n,t). R(n,t) is the rate of interest 
on an n year maturity bond at time t. R(l,t) is the rate on 
a one year security at time t, and S(n,t) is the spread be­
tween R(l,t) and R(n,t) at time t. However, S(n,t) is also 
influenced by supply and demand in each maturity category. 
Restated the model becomes: 
Expected return on an n period bond 
•= R(n,t) • expected capital gain 
= R(l,t) • Pt 
where stands for the supply effects. Taking the expected 
capital gain (loss) as proportional to the expected fall 
(rise) in the long rate and solving for R(n,t) we have; 
R(n,t) = R(l,t) AR®(n,t) • Pf Equation 1 
The authors point out that, if ^  is constant,^ AR®(n,t) is 
actually an approximation for expected capital gain, but 
that ^  is a function of n and R(n,t) such that dealing with 
a fixed maturity n makes the effect of R(n,t) sufficiently 
^The reader will note that this conclusion, though not 
very rigorous, is essentially that reached by the current 
writer. 
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small to be neglected to a first approximation (61, p. 185). 
In order to put Equation 1 into a testable form M&S 
drav upon the work of Prank de Leeuw (24). To obtain a 
model of expectations de Leeuw combined the Keynesian re­
gressive hypothesis, that rates are expected to return to 
a long-run normal level, and the Duesenberry extrapolative 
hypothesis, that rates are expected to continue in the pres­
ent direction. M&S modify his work slightly so that the 
regressive hypothesis is stated as: 
— ™ 
Rt = TZ;<iRt-i + (i-v)c o<\r<i 
1=1 ^  
m 
where is the long rate, ^ weighted series of 
m past long rates; thejw.^*s are weights and = 1* and c 
is some very long-run normal rate level. 5^ is the normal 
rate level to which rates are expected to return and ie com­
posed of the weighted m past rates and c. Since recent ex­
perience should presently exert more influence than past ex­
perience, M&S expect that the/A^'s will decline into the past 
as i rises. Formalized, the regressive hypothesis is: 
__ r m 
=c^l(%t-Bt) =c<ll^iEl^iBt-i + (l-T)c - R 
wherec<2^  ^ measures the speed with which. R^ is expected to ap­
proach R^. 
The extrapolative hypothesis is stated as: 
R^ =<<2(8% " ^ 2^i^t-i^ CX2>0» 
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n 
where 2! b i Is a weighted series of n past long rates; 
1=1 i 
n 
the S. 's are weights and, 3^5 = 1. M&S expect that n should 
1=1 1 
be smaller than, m as extrapolation involves only the very re­
cent past and, therefore, theSj^'s should decline rapidly 
(61, p. 186). 
Noting, as does de Leeuw, that both hypotheses may hold, 
the two are simultaneously solved for ARI^, the result being: 
n 
AR| = -aR^ • % ^i^t-1 * Equation 2 
where a = 
^i =°^iV"% 
d =o<3^(l -T) 
w i t h  & =  0  f o r  i > n .  
The summation is not a simple lag, but is the difference be-
m 
tween two separate lag structures ; cx-iVSM.* Is the regressive 
i=l ^ 
n 
lag (o^n and V are constants) and < Is the extrapola-
 ^ '^ 1=1 
lag (cs<2 constant), M&S then hypothesize that theSj^'s should 
fall faster than the/A^'s, since the extrapolative lag sup­
posedly exerts a shorter, weaker influence on current rates; 
thus the b^'s should rise to a peak at n (when the extrapola­
tive lag weight becomes zero) and then fall back to zero as 
the/Jkj^'s decline to zero (6l, p. 186). 
Equation 2, the statement for^R^, ia substituted into 
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Equation 1, yielding; 
Et = -§aa^ • •Çdc + 
Where r^ = R(l,t). Solving for produces: 
m 
= Ar^ + 5^ BjRt-i + 0 + Equation 3 
where A = 1 , B, = ^ ^ , G = ^dc , Pi is the supply 
1+^a 1+^a 1 1+^a 
term, and is the error term. 
The model is now ready for estimation and testing. The 
major problem is that posed by the lag term. It is not of a 
familiar form which lends itself to ordinary tests. M&S rely 
upon a technique developed by Almon (4) which imposes few re­
strictions on the lag structure. The estimation technique 
involves calculation of Lagrangian interpolation polynomials, 
which are used to weight a specified number of past values of 
the variable to be used in the lag. The weighted averages are 
then entered in an ordinary least squares regression equation 
to fit the lag. The authors conclude that, since the lag was 
expected to rise to a single peak and then fall, a fourth 
degree polynomial would be "sufficiently flexible to closely 
reproduce the true structure" (61, p. 187). It would ordin­
arily take five Lagrangian polynomials and thus five "Almon" 
variables to fit the lag, but the a priori specification that 
the lag fall to zero allows estimation of only four of each. 
One obstacle remains to the final estimation. Rt is 
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currently a function of lagged past values of itself and this, 
in the presence of a serially correlated error term, would lead 
to biased estimates of the coefficients. It would also 
likely lead to severe multicollinearity problems. M&S resolve 
the problem by expressing as a function of r^ emd a 
weighted average of This can be shown to be possible 
by using Equation 3 to express terms of r^^j^ and 
Rt_2# and so on recursively. Therefore R^ can be expressed 
as an average of a small number of lagged r terms (6l, p. IBS). 
The final equation to be estimated emerges as^ 
m 
Rt = Ço^t * "^*\t ' Equation 4 
where R^ is the yield on long Governments (due or callable in 
over ten years), r^ is the Treasury bill rate, and is the 
error term. This equation was fitted to quarterly data from 
1952-1 to 1961-IV, The actual data were fitted to the spread, 
= R^ - r^, which changes no statistical properties but 
makes now (1-^^). The results reported by M&S are: 
16 
S+ = 1.239 - 0.684r. + 2[b,r+ . 
^ (0.028) (0.030)t 1=1 
R^ = .975 Sg = .093 m = 1.42 
^The authors note that the difference between Equation 3 
and Equation 4 is that if Equation 3 has nonserially correlated 
errors, then Equation 4 will have an autoregresslve error, 
and vice versa (61, p. 188). 
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The lag term was tried with lags from two to seven years, 
with the best result coining at four years. The 16 weights in 
this lag were all statistically significant and gave the pre­
dicted shape. The authors presented the results graphically, 
and a sketch of the lag shape is presented in Figure 3,3, 
07-
06-
04-
0) 
02-
01. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 l4 15 l6 
Quarters lag 
Figure 3.3, Modigliani and Sutch lag structure 
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The values of the standard errors are all much less than 
half of the coefficient values so that a band of plus and 
minus one standard error would follow the lag contour very 
closely. Results obtained from lag lengths other than 16 
quarters were not reported. 
Having successfully found a model for expectalons, the 
remaining task is to test for the presence of supply effects. 
The authors point out that the close fit of the model allows 
only small influence for M&S state that they have re­
peated the tests of many other investigators and are unable 
to find any influence attributable to supply effects (61, 
p. 192). Again, no test results are reported. 
The major supply test reported by M&S is a test of the 
effects of a debt swap called Operation Twist.^ Briefly, the 
Operation Twist was a debt swap carried out from roughly 
1961 to 1964 designed to reduce the interest rate spread on 
U.S. Governments and, hopefully, private debt. The Federal 
Reserve System was to release short debt and accumulate long 
debt, which would presumably raise the short rate and at least 
not raise the long rate. The rationale was to push up short 
rates to stem the large short-term capital outflows drawn to 
the European markets by Institutionally higher short-term 
rates. This was to be done without pushing up the long rate, 
which presumably would have been detremental to growth emd 
capital formation. 
The success of the operation clearly depended upon the 
market's positive reaction to supply changes. Ex post» the 
record of Operation Twist is not clear. An examination of 
Federal Reserve Bulletins (15) shows no noticeable change in 
the Federal's portfolio which could be interpreted as vigor­
ous pursual of Twist objectives. M&S even point out that over 
the Twist period the average maturity of the debt rose from 
4.3 to 5.7 years, which is opposite to what it should have 
(footnote continued on following page) 
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authors extrapolated the original equation (fitted from 1952-1 
to 1961-IV) Into the Twist period (from 1962-1 to 1965-II)» and 
found that it predicted nearly as well In as out of the period. 
The Implication Is that no supply effects were present or the 
expectations part of the model would not have fit the data 
so well and something more would have been accounted for by 
the supply term. This finding Is not surprising, as the au­
thors themselves observe that Twist was not vigorously pursued 
(61, p. 192). The effects that were found In the latter part 
of the period were attributed to the successive rise In 
Regulation celling rates payable on time deposits. The 
(footnote continued from previous page) done (61, p. 192). 
Perhaps the proper conclusion from all of this Is not 
that Twist failed, but that It was not tried. Had a vigor­
ous policy of shortening the average maturity of the debt 
been carried out, we might have seen vastly different re- . 
suits. It Is this possibility which leads us to pick the 
wartime period for examination. 
Further discussion of Operation Twist may be found in 
Schlesinger (89), Gaines (34), and Yeager and Young (111). 
^Regulation Q is the regulation administered by the 
Federal Reserve System limiting the amount of interest which 
can be paid on time deposits, M&S fit a Regulation Q rate 
variable to their equation to account for that which was un­
accounted for by expectations. The significance for the 
variable found, they argue, simply means that the rise in Q 
rates made Certificates of Deposit an effective alternative 
to short-term Treasury bills. This movement would have taken 
place even in the absence of debt swap, so that what should 
be attributed to Q rate Influences has mistakenly been at­
tributed to Twist. 
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authors conclude that supply changes are not effective, and 
even if they were they could only affect what is not deter­
mined by expectations which, in this model, is at most 20 
basis points (61, p. 196). 
While this test is an interesting one, the more rele­
vant undertaking is M&S (60). In this study the authors fit 
essentially the same model to data from 1952-1 to 1966-1 and 
obtain; 
16 
R = 1.491 • 0.259r^ + ^b.r^ . 
 ^ (0.063) ( .036)t 1=1 1 
= .959 
"Sg = .128 (corrected for 6 degrees of freedom lost in 
estimation). 
These results are essentially the same as those in their 
previous paper, except the long rate only is used as the de­
pendent variable and the period covered is longer. The 
weights In the lag again are all significant and the struc­
ture looks much as before. 
M&S's approach in this paper is that of fitting the ex­
pectations model and then examining the regression residuals 
for the presence of supply effects. Again only the results of 
the 16 quarter lag are reported. This lag, the authors state, 
"...proved optimal, in terms of the standard error of esti­
mate." (60, p. 573) The residuals of the regression appear 
to have some systematic force working on them as evidenced 
by the low Durbin-Watson statistic of 0.582. Various supply 
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measures were appended to the original equation on the grounds 
that if had any influence on current rates, the supply var­
iables would show up statistically significant. 
The Plow of Funds section of the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System has computed weighted debt maturity 
measures which M&S used for F^ variables. The four series 
employed are as follows; 
Proportion of Short 
Includes all securities maturing in one 
year plus proportions of those maturing 
between one and two years, the proportions 
falling linearly from 100 per cent for one 
year maturities to zero for over two years 
maturity. 
Intermediate I 
Includes a linearly rising from 0 to 100 
per cent proportion of maturities of one 
to two years, all maturities of two to four 
years, and a linearly declining proportion 
of maturities of four to six years. 
Intermediate II 
Includes linearly rising proportions of 
those securities due in four to six years, 
all due in six to eight years, and linearly 
declining proportions of those due in eight 
to twelve years. 
Long 
Includes linearly rising proportions of 
securities due in eight to twelve years, 
and all due in over twelve years. 
These measures, while not perfect, overcome the problem of 
arbitrary boundries on debt categories (48). In tnis way 
there are no large discontinuities when an issue goes from 
(say) 10 years to 9 years and 364 days thus passing from 
"long" to "intermediate". 
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These debt variables and their first differences, along 
•with average maturity, were added to the original equation in 
combinations and alone. The only reported results are for 
the variables alone, shown in Table 3.4. The authors argue 
that these results are inconsistent with a priori expectations 
of supply effects. The average maturity sign should be posi­
tive since an increase in the average maturity should raise 
the long-term rate (60, p. 578). It may also be argued that 
an Increase in the proportion of short to total debt should 
raise the short rate and reduce the spread so that the 
coefficient should be negative. Intermediate I should have a 
positive sign since it is closer to the short end than the 
long, but the level has the wrong sign and the change vari­
able is insignificant. By the same argument Intermediate II 
and Long should have positive coefficients, but they either 
have the wrong sign, are insignificant, or both. We will have 
some comments in the next chapter which may shed light on 
these results. 
Further tests were carried out due to the inadequacy of 
the original data. First, note that the long rate used is 
an average of rates on bonds due or callable in over 10 years. 
Supply effects may, therefore, be washed out in the averaging. 
That is, any rate changes Induced by supply effects may be 
swamped by the movement of other rates in the average. 
Second, it may also be that debt management effects are more 
readily observable in intermediate maturities (60, p, 583)» 
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Table 3.4. Results from Modigliani and Sutoh's American 
Economic Review paper 
Coefficient and standard 
error 
Variable 
Level Change 
Average maturity -0.048 -0.098 
(0.042) (0.076) 
Proportion of Short 0.178 1.715 
(0.385) (0.777)*a 
Intermediate I 1.164 -0.714 
(0.334)* (1.048) 
Intermediate II -1.415 -2.694 
(0.323)* (1.186)* 
Long 0.215 -1.535 
(1.440) (2.722) 
Ratio of Long to Short 0.160 0.173 
(0.136) (0.134) 
^Coefficient is more than twice its standard error. 
Debt management is not limited to long maturities , but is 
carried out on the entire range of debt maturity. To solve 
these two problems M&S obtained data from the Morgan 
Guarantee Trust which keeps daily, records of its own dealings 
in Governments. They prepare a monthly average yield-to-
maturity for each issue and then draw a smooth curve through 
these points. One can effectively obtain a monthly average 
for any maturity by reading off the curve. These data are far 
superior to Treasury or Durand curves as the former are drawn 
94 
for one day and the latter for one year while Morgan data 
are averages of daily observations. 
The authors fitted the l6 quarter lag to these data and 
found results nearly as good as previous results, but again 
failed to report on any other than the 16 quarter lag. The 
results for constant maturities of 2, 4, 8, and 12 years 
follow: 
16 
R(2)+ = 0.409 • 0.852 r+ + 
^ (0.114) (0.066) 1=1 1 1 
R2 = .943 Sg = .232 
16 
a(4) = 0.726 • 0.661 r. + ^b^r^ 
(0.114) (0.066) ^  i=i ^ 
R2 = .931 Sg = .233 
16 
R(8) = 1.064 + 0.465 r. + %bir+ . 
(0.085) (0.050) ^  1=1 
R^  = .949 Sg = .174 
16 
R(12) = 1.234 + 0.368 r+ + :^b,r+ . 
(0.072) (0.042) ^  1=1 1 ^  1 
R2 = .958 Sg = .146 
The weights in the lag were not given but the lags were 
graphed and had much the same shape as the lag in Figure 3.3. 
In explaining the next test the authors state that, each 
maturity's rate should be most affected by debt supply in its 
own maturity range. Therefore, R(n,t) and r^ should be most 
affected by the ratio of debt in the n year maturity range 
to debt in the shortest range (60, p. 584). Each of the 
95 
maturities were then tested against the appropriate ratio and 
its change. The results are shown in Table 3.5. It should be 
noted that Short I is three months debt, not the Proportion of 
Short earlier defined. The other coefficients in the equation 
are not reported as they are not changed by the new variables 
(60, p. 586). While the 12 and 8 year rates are not encour­
aging, there is statistical significance and a proper sign 
associated with the 4 and 2 year categories. M&S state that 
a number of other tests were run but, "This battery of tests 
has, on the whole, proved as disappointing and inconclusive 
as those we have reported above..." (60, p.587) None of the 
"other" tests were reported, 
M&S conclude that the data support the expectations hy­
pothesis and do not support the segmentation hypothesis. But 
there are some reservations about the data in general. In 
particular it is noted that the tests are carried out only 
with Government security data and this ignores a significant 
part of the debt market. This is indeed a shortcoming of 
all of these tests but, unfortunately, the data for more 
inclusive tests are not available. 
The authors also point out in passing: 
"Grounds for doubting that supply effects are 
totally absent are also suggested by specific 
episodes, such as the experience with pegging 
of the rate structure during the war and par­
tial pegging in the pre-accord period. Cursory 
examination of the events suggests that the 
pegging was feasible, though it necessitated 
large accommodating changes in the age struc­
ture of the publicly held supply." (60, p. 589) 
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It is this period which we will examine in the next 
chapters, 
Table 3.5. Results from Modigliani and Sutch's test of 
Morgan data 
Coefficient and standard 
error 
Maturity Variable 
Level Change 
12 years Ratio of Long to Short I 0.189 0.224 
(0.162) (0.158) 
8 years Ratio of Intermediate II -0.234 0.063 
to Short I (0.105)** (0.209) 
4 years Ratio of Intermediate I 0.469 0.402 
to Short I (0.084)* (0.174)* 
2 years Ratio of Intermediate I 5.03 0.408 
to Short I (0.082)* (0.175) 
^Coefficient is more than twice its standard error. 
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HISTORICAL REVIEW 
I 
Data from the Federal bond market for the years 1941 to 
1951 are used for the statistical tests of the theory pre­
sented in this dissertation. To get an accurate idea whe­
ther or not supply effects exist, it seems reasonable to look 
at a period when the supply operations being undertaken were 
known. (Scott, Okun, and K&S all test data when there were 
no particular supply changes going on. Operation Twist was 
not really tried and the others pick times when debt policy 
was inactive.) For our test period we have chosen the war 
period precisely because it was a period of massive inter­
vention by the federal Reserve and the Treasury, It was a 
period characterized by large changes in the volume and matur­
ity structure of the public debt. It was a period character­
ized by massive and continual intervention aimed particularly 
at affecting the shape and level of the yield curve. In short 
it was a period when, if supply operations have any effect at 
all, they would almost surely appear. The period is usually 
rejected as atypical, or as a period when the market in gen­
eral, and expectations in particular were extraordinarily dis­
turbed, It is not rejected here because, as will be borne out 
by this chapter, the disturbing effects are partly those of 
supply operations, When one excludes from analysis periods of 
"unusual" intervention one excludes periods when supply oper­
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ations were most vigorously undertaken, and this excludes 
supply effects a -priori. For these reasons 1941-1951 was 
selected as a test period. 
Before examining the data, the events and conditions 
surrounding the market during this period will be briefly 
examined. It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the 
wartime finance conditions and thereby set the stage for 
empirical tests. 
The war period, unique in monetary history, has been 
treated very lightly in the professional and popular liter­
ature. There are two major works extant which deal with the 
era in detail, both of which ^ e rely upon heavily in what 
follows. National Debt in War and Transition, by Henry C. 
Murphy (who at the time was Assistant Director of Research 
and Statistics for the U.S. Treasury), and Inflation in the 
United States 1940-1948. by Lester V. Chandler, are the two 
works Indicated, These works concern themselves with the 
general problems of war finance and only secondarily with 
bond market activity. The substantial volume of literature 
on term structure theory has bypassed the period almost com­
pletely.^ 
That the war period was a period of massive supply 
changes can hardly be doubted. As of April 30, 1941, after 
^There are two exception, Charls Walker (101) and the 
brief mention by Modigliani and Sutch (60). 
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war finance to aid England had begun but before the major 
finance thrust, the par value of the Public Marketable Inter­
est Bearing Debt Issued or Guaranteed by the U.S. Government 
stood at 43,608 millions of dollars. At its peak on February 
28, 1946, it reached #199,849 millions (98), an increase of 
about 450 per cent in five years. After the war the debt was 
moderately reduced. During the defense period from 1940-1945 
the government raised $380 billion, of which 60 per cent was 
borrowings and 40 per cent taxation (14:1945)• Of the bor­
rowings about 80 per cent was in the form of Public Marketable 
Interest Bearing Debt Issued or Guaranteed by the U.S. Govern­
ment (98:1946). By the Accord in March, 1951, it stood at 
#151,642 millions,^ 
To issue this amount of debt in such a short period of 
time took a great deal of cooperation between the Treasury 
and the monetary authorities. The cooperation which did exist 
between the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System is by now 
almost legend. Even as war gradually broke out in Europe it 
was clear that the U.S. would soon be either directly involved 
or be called upon to give substantial aid to faltering England. 
The market was not unprepared for the intervention which 
was to come. The Federal Reserve and the Treasury had been 
! 
^It might be pointed out that these figures refer only 
to Public Marketable Interest Bearing Debt Issued or Guaran­
teed by the U.S. Government, and that total debt figures are 
somewhat different. 
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intervening in the market many years before the inception of 
official finance policy in 1942. During the '30*8 the Federal 
Reserve System had, for the first time, been active in pro­
tecting the yield on U.S. Government securities. Open Market 
Operations to maintain an orderly market were often used, so 
that the idea of intervention was certainly not new with WW II 
(20, p. 148). The entire prewar period monetary control was 
complicated by the huge free reserves which arose from the 
gold inflows of the '30's. The existence of these large re­
serves caused yields on governments to decline through the 
'30's so that at the outbreak of war rates were lower than 
they had been at any time in recent history. Excess reserves 
were so large in the prewar period that some issues of Treasury 
bills in 1939 and 1940 sold at negative yields 
In 1939 when war broke out with the German invasion of 
Poland, long-term governments fell 2 and 21/32, and the mone­
tary authority then intervened. The Fed bought $60 millions 
of federal bonds from dealers to protect them from losses due 
to wartime market instability (62, p. 221). To insure stabil­
ity, and to minimize the jeopardy of the commercial banks' 
portfolios, the System announced that it would advance funds 
^The catch of course is that funds held in U.S. Govern­
ments were not taxable, but that was also true of funds held 
in any government security including those with positive 
yield. This might be interpreted as a strong statement of 
maturity preference (97:1940, p. 110). 
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on U.S. Government Securities at par to all banks. Late in 
*39 the market recovered and continued to rise so that in 
December of 1940 the fed asked Congress to raise the limit 
on reserve requirements to 26 per cent in central reserve 
cities, 20 per cent in cities, 14 per cent in country banks, 
and 6 per cent for all time deposits. This was necessary to 
absorb the volume of excess reserves outstemding. This was 
done. Through the remainder of 1939 and up to Pearl Harbor 
on December 7, 1941, the monetary authority intervened to 
stabilize capital markets, protect member banks from wide 
fluctuations in bond prices, and to prepare the market for the 
large financing that was surely coming. 
With the Pearl Harbor tragedy the nation was shocked 
into the middle of a wartime emergency. The Federal Reserve 
responded with the following statement: 
"The financial and banking mechanism of the 
country Is today in a stronger position to meet 
any emergency than ever before. 
The existing supply of funds and of bank 
reserves is fully adequate to meet all present and 
prospective needs of the Government and of private 
activity. The Federal Reserve System has powers to 
add to these resources to whatever extent may be 
required in the future. The System is prepared to 
make use of Its powers to assure that an ample 
supply of funds Is available at all times for fin­
ancing the war effort and to exert its influence 
toward maintaining conditions in the United States 
Government Security market that are satisfactory 
from the standpoint of the Government's requirements. 
Continuing the policy which was announced fol­
lowing the outbreak of war In Europe, Federal Re­
serve Banks stand ready to advance funds on United 
States Government Securities at par to all banks," 
(14:1941, p. 1) 
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Just after Pearl Harbor the Federal Open Market Com­
mittee bought $45 million of '51-'55 and '67-'72*s bonde, 
@12 million of bills, and $13 million of various issues in 
support of the bond market (14:1941, p. 65). This inter­
vention and statement signaled the beginning of formal war 
finance, and adjustments came very quickly thereafter. 
One of the first moves into war finance was the cessa­
tion of tax exempt security issues. After March 1, 1941, 
interest on all federal securities issued after that time 
was subject to federal Income and excess profits tax. At 
the same time the issuing of guaranteed securities ceased, 
making debt control somewhat easier from the Treasury's point 
of view. 
Once the initial shock of war had passed, the problem of 
financing an extended war arose. After extensive debate with­
in and between the Treasury and Federal Reserve System (62, 
pt. 2), it was decided that the major share of the war would 
be financed by voluntary borrowing. (The institutional pro­
cesses and reasons behind this decision make an interesting 
study, but are beyond our scope.) 
It was at once clear that the major source of wartime 
credit was to be the commercial banking system. Treasury 
and Fed officials unanimously agreed that the preferred 
ranking of fund sources would be as follows : 
1. individuals 
2. non-financial corporations 
3. non-bank financial corporations 
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4. commercial banks 
5. Federal Reserve Banks 
The sources at the top of the list would be the least 
inflationary places to borrow. A very large effort indeed 
was exerted to place the debt at the top of the list, but it 
was known that eventually it would be necessary to fall back 
on choices 4 and 5« Ideally, idle funds would be taken out 
of the hands of individuals and corporations and used by the 
Government for war purchases. It was hoped also that an ef­
fective borrowing program would lower marginal propensities 
to consume, and thus not only soak up existing private saving, 
but create additional saving. 
The rejection of any compulsory finance limited the 
Treasury's ability to place the debt where it desired. 
Heavy reliance on taxation and compulsory borrowing were 
rejected because the latter was an unfamiliar device and the 
former invited disincentive effects (20, p. 144). Disincen­
tive effects from high tax rates were clearly something which 
a wartime effort could not stand. It is also the case that 
taxation was not heavily used from simple underestimation of 
the cost of the war. 
Given the voluntary approach it was up to the Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve to produce an atmosphere of safety 
and certainty so that lenders would willingly trade funds for 
securities. The first half of 1942 was devoted to bringing 
about this atmosphere. Effective February 28, the discount 
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rate was lowered to 1 per cent and reserve requirements were 
lowered by several steps to 20 per cent for central reserve. 
city banks, 18 per cent for reserve city banks, and 13 per 
cent for country banks. These moves assured, for the moment, 
that the banking system could maintain adequate reserves in 
the face of growing finance demands. 
The Federal Reserve and the Treasury next turned to the 
method of finance* How best to insure stability in the market 
and instill confidence in lenders? The mutually acceptable 
approach was that of a frozen yield curve but the Treasury and 
the Fed had some difficulty deciding exactly where the curve 
should be (62, pt. 2). The long end was fairly-well agreed 
upon, but the short end brought some debate. The Treasury 
argued that the current level of short rates were somehow 
"normal" rates which the market would accept^, and this view 
prevailed. The result was that on April 30, 1942, the bill 
rate was posted (officially announced as a policy measure) 
at 3/8 per cent and the remainder of the yield curve, while 
not posted, was supported (carried out but not announced) at 
7/8 per cent for 12 months maturities, 2 per cent for 10 years, 
and 2^ per cent for 25 years (62, p. 103). This decision set 
the pattern of rates and directed the finance effort for the 
remainder of the war. 
There were a few alterations of this pattern which 
^For a sharply opposing view see Walker (101), 
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remained In force throughout the defense period. The most 
important change was the adoption of the repurchase agree­
ment. 
"Supplementing the direction of April 30, 
1942, issued by the Federal Open Market Commit­
tee to the Federal Reserve Banks to purchase all 
Treasury bills that may be offered to such Banks 
on a discount basis at the rate of 3/8 per cent per 
annum, any such purchases shall, if desired by the 
seller, be upon the conditions that the Federal 
Reserve Bank, upon the request of the seller before 
the maturity of the bills, will sell to him Treasury 
bills of like amount and maturity at the same rate 
of discount." (14:1942, p. 105) 
After the lender figured out this statement, what it 
did was to make bills as liquid as cash at the guarantee 
of the Federal Reserve System, One could be gotten for the 
other at any time» More of this presently. 
Simultaneous with the bill repurchase agreement a buy­
ing rate, but not a repurchase agreement, for 7/8 per cent 
certificates was posted. Though no guarantee for the rest 
of the curve was posted, it soon became evident that the 
Federal was Indeed pegging the yield curve on one side; that 
is, rates were not allowed to rise above the previously men­
tioned levels, but they could and did fall so long as the fall 
was not drastic. When rates rose to the celling the Federal 
Reserve purchased enough to stop the rise at the celling. 
In October of 1942 the Federal Reserve System established 
a preferential discount rate of % per cent of discounted matur­
ities of 1 year or less (14:1942, p. 105). This preferential 
rate was hardly advantageous since it was cheaper to discount 
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bills at 3/8 per cent than to discount at ^ per cent. In 
April 1943, the Federal Reserve Act was amended to allow 
limited direct purchases by the Fed from the Treasury and, 
more importantly the act was amended to delete reserve re­
quirements from U.S. Government deposits arising as a result 
of subscriptions for U.S. Government securities. 
With these final two alterations the pattern of war 
finance was set. Emphasis was placed on injecting certainty 
into the marketplace by freezing the rate structure. Heavy 
emphasis was also placed on insuring tnas the banking system 
had adequate reserves to purchase new securities. In keeping 
with efforts to maintain liquidity in the banking system, 
the 2^*s of *52-*55 issued February 25, 1942, was the last 
issue of over 2 per cent, over 10 years maturity securities 
for which banks were allowed to compete. Securities subse­
quently issued were restricted from bank ownership until the 
securities had 10 or less years to first call or maturity. 
Securities issued before February 25, 1942, were unaffected 
by the restriction. 
On May 4, 1942, an issue of 2^'s of 1962-1957 was well-
received and this nailed down the proposed rates (62, p. 107)» 
Only once did the professional market balk at the rate pat­
tern. In October 1942, a financing nearly failed apparently 
because the market seemed to expect a rate rise. The situ­
ation came to the point that Treasury and Federal Reserve 
officials had to call on friends in the commercial banking 
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world to Increase their subscriptions under the guarantee 
that the Federal would take the securities off their hands 
if desired. This episode quelled suspicion of a rate rise 
and financing went smoothly thereafter (62, p. 120), 
The rationale for official policy was twofold; (1) the 
semi-stable yield structure was designed to Inject certainty 
into the market by protecting investors from wide price fluc­
tuations; (2) the posted bill rate, complete with repurchase 
option, guaranteed that the banking system would have suf­
ficient reserves to handle Treasury financing needs. To in­
sure an adequate volume of eligible securities was available 
the Treasury began issuing 12 month certificates of indebted­
ness at 7/8 per cent per annum, and it increased its weekly 
bill offering from $150 million to #600 million (14:1942, 
p. 10). During 1942 the following amounts of debt were ab­
sorbed by the indicated sources: 
Commercial Banks *19.5 
Federal Reserve Banks 3.9 
Mutual Savings Banks 0.9 
Life Insurance Companies 3.0 
Others 
marketable 5.2 
non-marketable 12.6 
Federal Agencies and Trusts 
special issues 2.0 
public Issues 
Total 
Perhaps the most important aspect of this policy for 
our purposes is that it made the Federal a sort of money-
vending machine. All a federal security holder need do was 
Insert a security and the machine paid off — at par. If 
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the security happened to "be a bill the Investor could even 
get It back If he didn't like the money. In essence, the 
Federal Reserve lost all control over the money supply and 
became a residual debt holder, holding what debt the public 
didn't want. Even though the Fed had only pledged Itself to 
a price floor, it occasionally sold securities to maintain 
this pattern, although this practice was not vigorously or 
even systematically pursued (20, pp. 189-191). 
Against this framework the Treasury had to finance the 
war effort. The financing took place through seven war loans 
and a so-called Victory Loan. In these loans were securities 
of varying characteristics which fit the supported yield pat­
tern. A summary of the war loans from the Treasury Bulletin 
of August 1945 is presented in Figure 4.1. 
The choice of voluntary borrowing and low reliance on 
taxation or any other compulsory means of financing severely 
constrained the Treasury's available alternatives. It had, 
somehow, to make its wares attractive enough to draw funds 
from the primary targets (individuals, non-financlals, and 
non-bank financlals) while discouraging bank purchases. It 
had, in brief, to design its securities to be most attractive 
to the group which was the target. 
The war loans consisted of a mix of securities, each 
designed for a particular group. Nonmarketable Issues, series 
E bonds, were sold only to individuals and carried a higher 
rate than any marketable bond. The return was designed to be 
Figure 4.1. Comparison of sales in the seven war loans, 
by Investor classes and by issues 
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very low if the bond were cashed early, but rose to 2.9 per 
cent if held to its maturity of 10 years. Series F and Series 
G bonds had much the same characteristics but had slightly dif­
ferent maturities and slightly different yields. In addition 
they were available to non-individuals on a limited basis. 
Series C Treasury Tax Savings Notes had a less than 3-year 
maturity at 1 per cent and were used mostly by corporations 
as tax anticipation notes. Each of these was designed to 
sell to a particular group and absorb savings. 
The marketable securities Included bills at 3/8 per cent 
and certificates at 7/8 per cent, which have already been 
mentioned. Included also for diversity were notes from 1 to 
5 years maturity carrying yields of 0.90 per cent for less 
than 1 year, 1.25 per cent for 3 years, and 1.5 per cent for 
5 years. The longest securities were bonds of over 5 years 
(mostly between 10 and 25 years) which carried yields of 2 
per cent, 2^ per cent, and 2^ per cent depending on their 
length (20, ch. 6). 
All of the securities noted above were included in each 
war loan except bills, which were excluded after the second, 
and notes, which were offered only in the fifth and sixth 
loans. The goal of fitting the securities to the investor 
was well-served by this diversity of offering. 
Por the December 1941 financing the Treasury announced 
a set of new guides for subscriptions. Bank and Trust com­
pany subscriptions for their own accounts were not to exceed 
114 
30 per cent of surplus and capital. Non-bank flnancials 
were allowed up to 10 per cent of total resources. Corpor­
ations, brokers, and dealers were allowed up to 50 per cent 
of net worth. Individuals were allowed subscriptions for 
up to 50 per cent of net worth if cash was not deposited with 
the subscription or 100 per cent of cash deposited with sub­
scriptions, No preferential allotments were made to those 
who deposited cash with the subscriptions as opposed to those 
who opted for payment on delivery (97:1942, p. 22). Banks 
were, after the second war loan, excluded from subscription, 
but could hold all but bank restricted securities as soon as 
they reached the secondary market. By May 1942 these limi­
tations were dropped and never reinstated. 
Throughout the entire war period the Treasury kept an 
emphasis on having the debt in short-term maturities, and 
Issuing at and maintaining low interest rates. The Treasury 
argued that short-term debt was less costly, easier to refund, 
and easier to manage in a post-war period. For this reason 
issues of Treasury bills and certificates continued at a high 
level. For the entire war period about 36 per cent of the debt 
was due in 1 year or less, and well over half was due in less 
than 10 years. In the later war loans. Treasury bills were 
not counted as part of the loan but were nevertheless con­
tinually offered. About #11 billion of bills were issued 
during the war period which were not counted as part of 
war loans. Other nonmarketable issues were also continually 
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on sale but not listed as part of the war loans (98). 
This discussion of the war loans has been brief because 
the only concern of war loans was the primary market. Once 
the securities had passed the primary market they were redis­
tributed by market forces. All the careful planning and sales 
effort to place the debt with the desired investor classes 
was something less than foolproof. Much to the Treasury's 
consternation there was a huge flow of securities back to the 
banking system via the secondary market. We find, for example, 
in the Annual Report of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System for 1943: 
"The outstanding characteristic of bank in­
vestment during 1943 continued, as in 1942, to 
be a growth both in amount and proportion to 
total portfolio in holdings of short- and medium 
term Government securities. At the end of the year 
24 per cent of the marketable Government securities 
held by commercial banks had maturities of less than 
one year and 86 per cent were to mature within 10 
years, compared with 10 per cent and 63 per cent 
respectively at the end of 1941." (14:1943, p. 15) 
The banking system continued to absorb through secondary mar­
kets more of the debt than the Treasury liked, but given the 
voluntary borrowing approach there was no help for it. The 
only strong and effective limitation used was the issuance of 
bank-restricted securities. 
With the single exception of over-absorption by the bank­
ing system the preceeding pattern of finance is what the 
Treasury intended. The entire procedure was designed around 
four principal tenets of war finance. 
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First, funds should be raised to minimize the risk of 
inflation. The least inflationary sources are individuals, 
non-financial corporations, etc. down to banks. Thus, the 
effort to keep securities out of banks. 
Second, liquidity of financial institutions should be 
maintained to aid reconversion and fend off postwar depression. 
The finish of other major wars had been followed by rising 
unemployment and falling income as the large wartime demand 
fell off. It was expected that this war would be no different 
and that financial institutions should therefore be in a 
position to rapidly expand credit when the time came. It is, 
by now, a well-known story that failure to examine the extent 
of private savings led to this unfortunate suspicion, but it 
was a motivation for the Treasury to keep Issues short and 
liquid. Along with this we see expressed time and time again 
the desirability of low interest rates which will help avoid 
postwar stagnation. It was fully expected by most Treasury 
officials that when the war ended we would again be faced 
with depression conditions. This expectation led to the low 
rate-short debt approach so vigorously pursued. 
Third, small Investors should be protected from undue 
losses arising from market fluctuations. This tenet gave 
rise to the pegged market, 
Fourth, the cost of finance should be kept at a reasonable 
level (97:1942, p. 22), This along with the depression and 
stagnation fears brought forth the peg at the lowest interest 
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rates in history. 
Another guarantee to both the small and large investor 
was that, at the request of the îed, dealers limited the price 
movements on governments in any one day to 8/32 of 1 per cent. 
This restriction did not prevent price movements, it merely 
slowed them. 
For the most part, the financing went successfully. The 
Federal Reserve managed to carry out its peg, and the Treasury 
had no difficulty in getting an adequate aunount of subscrip­
tions, Usually the war loans went well over the stated goal. 
Probably the major problem was maintaining an adequate demand 
for very short debt which, due to the peg, had become as liquid 
as money. As we will see later, it was only reasonable for 
investors to abandon Treasury bill issues and move into the 
more profitable longer-term securities. The demand for short 
debt dropped considerably but never made the Treasury bill 
financing fail. Even at the low point bill issues were over­
subscribed by 122 per cent (62, p. 212), 
The medium-term securities were the ones which picked up 
most of the activity which would normally have occurred in the 
very short market. These security yields fell the most while 
longs, at the war's end, were only slightly above their begin­
ning level. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 display charts from the No­
vember 1941 and February 1946 Treasury Bulletins which show 
the yield curves on Government securities as of November 15» 
1941, and December 31, 1945, respectively. 
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With the announcement of the Victory Loan on October 29, 
1945, the war finance drive came to an end. Secretary of the 
Treasury Morgenthau was succeeded by Secretary Vinson whose 
interests were more in the fields of taxation and international 
affairs, Sven so, little shift in departmental policy resulted 
from the change in Secretaries (62, p. 151). The Victory Loan 
was conceived only to tide the Government over the last days 
of the war. It was immediately over-subscribed and may not 
have been necessary, 
With the war emergency at an end and the pressure for 
massive borrowing removed, the Treasury and the Federal Re­
serve System turned to the problem of postwar debt management. 
In official statements, and in the annual reports of both the 
Treasury and the Ped, concern about adequate postwar liquidity 
and low interest rates is constantly repeated. Both agencies 
exhibit an overriding concern that the financial institutions 
be liquid enough to facilitate conversion to peacetime activ­
ities, Time and again this is the reason given for financing 
so much of the war by the issue of very short debt and for the 
maintenance of low rates. In the Annual Report of the Secre­
tary of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1945, 
for example, we find the following statement which is typical 
of statements in this period: 
"The particular securities of which the debt is 
composed have been devised as part of a conscious 
effort to fit the debt to the needs of the classes 
of investors who hold it. Accordingly, about 90 
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percent of the securities held by commercial and 
Federal Reserve Banks mature within ten years; 
similarly, about 95 percent of the securities held 
by nonfinancial corporations mature within ten 
years. On the other hand, in the case of insurance 
companies and savings banks, long-term securities 
predominate, and about 60 percent of the holdings 
for these two groups of investors do not mature 
until after ten years," (97:19^5* p. 5) 
The Treasury, then, was well-prepared to begin the recon­
version process. Its first steps were to begin reducing the 
accumulated debt by using the excess funds remaining from 
over-borrowing. About $23 billion of the $280 billion public 
debt was paid off in 1946 by reducing the Treasury's war loan 
accounts which were still swollen from the proceeds of the 
Victory Loan (14:1946, p. 3). 
It is at this point that the seeds of discontent between 
the Treasury and the Fed were germinated. When in full bloom 
they would lead to the Accord of 1951* When the emergency 
push was over, the Federal Reserve wanted off the hook; it 
disliked being bound to a particular yield structure which 
effectively took the control of the money supply out of its 
hands. The Fed wanted gradually to return the market to 
natural forces. The Treasury, however, was faced with massive 
refunding problems and had an interest in keeping rates low. 
There was also the fear of the postwar depression which was 
expected to come, and it was argued that this could only be 
made worse by higher rates. Finally, if rates were allowed 
to rise there would simply be too much cost involved. 
The two sides battled back and forth, mostly behind 
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closed doors. We are given some insight into the discussions 
(which were not at the time public) by Murphy (62) and by the 
recently released Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee 
1936-61 (28). The debate seems to have centered on the above 
issues, but none of it leaked into public circles. This per­
iod of uncertainty began early in 1946 when it was evident 
that the emergency financing had come to an end and that the 
reconversion would begin. 
The Federal Reserve's first move toward freedom was to 
remove the ^ per cent preferential discount rate on govern­
ments due or callable in less than a year. This rate, it 
was argued, was clearly a wartime emergency measure and no 
longer had a function. The Treasury however feared that such 
a move would be interpreted as a forerunner of generally 
higher rates. To turn loose such an expectation would do 
the refinancing effort no good. Murphy has the following to 
say of the spat: 
"The controversy came to a head with a long 
and strong letter sent by Secretary Vinson to Chair­
man Eccles at the end of March, reaffirming the 
Treasury's position (a much milder draft written by 
the author was over-ruled). In the middle of April 
the Federal Reserve replied in an equally long and 
strong letter informing the Secretary that it pro­
posed to eliminate the rate and assuring him that 
it would not allow this elimination to disturb the 
security markets. On April 24, 1946, action to 
eliminate the rate was taken by the first Federal 
Reserve banks, and Secretary Vinson issued a press 
release saying that 'The Treasury was fully informed 
of the proposal to eliminate the preferential dis­
count rate' — leaving the public to form its own 
judgement of previous interagency negotiations." 
(62, p. 220) 
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The board then removed the preferential discount rate 
by issuing the following statement: 
"The board has approved discontinuance of 
the preferential rate because it has served the 
purpose of facilitating the war-financing program 
for which it was adopted in 1942, The board does 
not favor a higher level of interest rates on U.S. 
securities than the Government is now paying. Dis­
continuance of the special rate will not involve 
any increase in the cost to Government of carrying 
the public debt." (14:1946, p. 93) 
This action caused some larger banks to slightly raise 
rates on loans secured by governments of one year or less 
maturity, but generally the rate removal was quietly re­
ceived, This was the first of several minor alterations 
which were to occur before the full Accord, This is also 
typical of the sort of relationship which existed between the 
Treasury and the Fed postwar. 
When war finance and the war expenditure ended, the 
Treasury turned to the task of retiring the debt while the 
Fed concentrated on other than bo;ad market aspects of recon­
version, Federal expenditures fell rapidly from $100 billion 
in 1945 to $63,7 billion in *46 to $42,5 billion in '4? and 
$36,3 billion in '48, Most of the debt retirement efforts 
were concentrated on the Federal Reserve System and the com­
mercial banking system. 
In July of 1947, when the predicted depression was ap­
parently not to ma+"Tialize, the 3/8 per cent peg and repur­
chase agreement on Treasury bills were removed. The short 
rate was allowed to rise, but not too rapidly. The Federal 
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Reserve System restricted "by ear" the rise in order to main­
tain market stability. At no time was there a hint that the 
long rate would be allowed to rise. In August of 19^7 the peg 
on certificates was removed and the certificate rate gradually 
rose to 1.13 per cent while the bill rate rose to around 1 per 
cent. 
The war's end brought on a powerful bull market; the 
yield on long term securities plunged the maximum allowable — 
i.e., to the point where the Federal stopped the fall. The 
situation was entirely psychological. No more war loans were 
forthcoming, and belief that adequate Investment opportunities 
could be provided by American industry was at an all-time low 
(62, p. 224). But the situation reversed itself just as 
quickly, and the Federal again had to exercise the rate 
ceiling. In late '4? and early 1948 major corporations were 
beginning to creep into the market with new Issues and this 
encouraged life insurance companies and holders of long-term 
governments to shift out of governments and into the corpor­
ate issues. As quickly as the market had become bull it be­
came bear and rates rose again to near-support levels. 
"On December 24 £194"^ prices of Treasury bonds 
were permitted to decline to a new level, which 
maintained the 2% per cent yield on the longest-
term Treasury bond and yields on other issues at 
appropriate levels in relation to this rate and to 
the 1 l/8 per cent rate on Treasury certificates. 
The Federal Reserve System became an active buyer 
at the new level. 
Large amounts of Treasury Bonds were purchased 
by the Reserve Banks during December 194? and the 
early weeks of 1948 In providing support to the 
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market. A substantial portion of these purchases 
were from banks. At the same time banks, as well 
as other investors, increased their holdings of 
Treasury bills, certificates, and notes. Since 
these were largely purchased from Federal Reserve 
accounts and since during the period the Treasury 
had a substantial cash surplus, which it continued 
to use to retire securities held by the Federal 
Reserve Banks, the total Federal Reserve portfolio 
of Government securities declined during the early 
weeks of 1948." (14:1947, p. 6) 
All during 1948 there were two major forces at work on 
the federal bond market. First, the Treasury was at every 
opportunity retiring debt from the Federal Reserve and the 
commercial banks. During 1948 $30.7 billion of debt held by 
Federal Reserve Banks and commercial banks was retired. Most 
of this, the Treasury claimed, was due to the massive issuance 
of short debt which is easily retired (97:1948, p. 2). The 
second major force was a movement by investors out of longs 
and into shorts. Most life insurance companies and holders 
of long debt shifted into private long-term issues, dumping 
governments on the Federal while the Federal thus lost short-
term debt to bank investors and the Treasury retirement pro­
gram. 
By the middle to latter part of 1948 the inflation, 
which had been raging through the entire period, and the in­
stability in the long-term debt market had abated. With this 
new-found stability came the System's exit from pegging a 
fixed rate structure. 
"The Federal Open Market Committee, after con­
sultation with the Treasury, announced today [June 
29» 19493 that with a view to increasing the supply 
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of funds available in the market to meet the needs 
of commerce, business, and agriculture it will be 
the policy of the committee to direct purchases, 
sales, and exchanges of Government securities by 
the Federal Reserve Banks with primary regard to 
the general business and credit situation. The 
policy of maintaining orderly conditions in the 
Government security market, and the confidence of 
investors in Government bonds, will be continued. 
Under present conditions the maintenance of a rel­
atively fixed pattern of rates has the undesirable 
effect of absorbing reserves from the market at a 
time when the availability of credit should be in­
creased." (14:1949, p. 8) 
This statement constituted the final break with a rigid 
rate ceiling, but by no means was an exit from the market. 
There was still heavy emphasis on maintaining orderly con­
ditions in the market. The long rate rose slowly and stabil­
ized itself around 2.8 per cent when the Federal exited, and 
this move was made only with the permission of the Federal 
Reserve System and was allowed only because it was consistent 
with orderly market conditions. The real difficulty was that 
maintaining orderly market conditions was not consistent with 
open market operations of any magnitude except those necessary 
to maintain order. While the Fed had managed to get away from 
fixed yields, it was still obliged to support the market re­
gardless of credit conditions, 
When the Korean conflict broke out, the Fed was in no 
better position than it was in 1949. On August 18, 1950, the 
Fed issued another policy statement which again shows its deli­
cate position on the razor edge between the abysses of market 
support on one side and credit control on the other. It was 
again caught between the need to support an orderly market 
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and the need to control wartime inflation. These appeared 
to be mutually exclusive undertakings: 
"Within the past six weeks loans and holdings 
of corporate and municipal securities have expanded 
by 1.5 billion dollars at banks in leading cities 
alone. Such an expansion under present conditions 
is clearly excessive. In view of this development 
and to support the Government's decision to rely in 
major degree for the immediate future upon fiscal 
and credit measures to curb inflation, the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the 
Federal Open Market Committee are prepared to use 
all the means at their command to restrain further 
expansion of bank credit consistent with the policy 
of maintaining orderly conditions in the Government 
securities market." (14:1950, p. 2) 
Immediately after the above statement the System purchased 
$8 billion of short maturities to insure that a forthcoming 
Treasury financing would succeed. Also during 1950 the com­
mercial banking system dumped about #5 billion into the 
Federal's lap in order to have funds for the war. This was 
fairly common practice throughout the entire period since the 
Federal Reserve was supporting, if not pegging, the market 
closely enough so that no one stood liable to sustain large 
capital losses. 
The above was the general tenor throughout '49, '50, 
and into '51 to the Accord, The Treasury had its problems 
with constantly refinancing the war debt and getting that debt 
into such a form that it would be held rather than being con­
stantly shifted about. The Treasury was now algo faced with 
the problem of financing another war. The Federal Reserve, 
on the other side, had pledged to aid the Treasury in the 
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form of market support, but also had the responsibility for 
controlling inflation. The Federal's position was made un­
tenable by the failure of its non-market discretionary con­
trols to slow down the credit expansion. It had raised the 
discount rate, raised reserve requirements, and engaged in 
some moral suasion to prevent credit expansion, all to little 
avail. An adjustment in the Federal's position was obviously 
necessary. 
After a long series of sometimes heated debate, the 
Accord came on March 4, 1951, The general public was, for 
the most part, unaware of the intensity of the strife and 
only rumors leaked into the press. Actually it was some time 
before the Accord took effect, since the Fed wanted to back 
out gently. 
The explanation of the Accord follows, 
"The fundamental problem which both the Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve faced in the postwar period 
developed out of the serious issue created by the 
existence of a huge public debt in a period of grow­
ing private demand for goods and services. Liqui­
dation of Government securities on the part of hold­
ers was an important source of funds for current 
spending and for credit expansion. In order to 
give some assurance to investors that their secur­
ities would not be subject to severe declines in 
prices and to encourage the holding of such secur­
ities and to aid Treasury refunding operations, the 
Federal Reserve had been following a policy of sup­
porting the market for Government securities. In 
view of the recurrent heavy demands for funds during 
the period, these purchases had the effect of mone­
tizing substantial amounts of Government securities. 
, Creating bank reserves, and laying the basis for ex­
cessive credit expansion," (14:1951, p. 98) 
130 
By way of not leaving the Treasury completely in the 
lurch, the Federal Open Market Committee (POMC) agreed to 
help support in the coming transition, and it also agreed 
to help to some extent during future refundings. The FOMC 
stated that it would let short rates alone and expect them to 
stabilize around the discount rate. It finally agreed that 
more frequent conferences should take place in the future to 
avoid the sort of conflict which had just occurred. 
Thus ended the bondage of the Federal Reserve System. 
The change, for a while, was more one of form than of sub­
stance . Support was only gradually withdrawn and was bound 
to return, at least temporarily, whenever the Treasury engaged 
in refunding. But in principle the two agencies once again 
became separate* 
There was a considerable amount of debate (20) (88) (91) 
(101) (103) (104) during and after the episode over the fin­
ancing approach taken. Ex post, it is reasonably clear that 
more of the burden of finance could have been borne by taxa­
tion and that some much-feared compulsory measures would not 
have been harmful. Yet, Murphy writes: 
"But was the war borrowing program a success? 
There can be no doubt that it was. In the author's 
opinion it was by a wide margin the best handled and 
most successful which the country has ever seen* 
Throughout the entire period war finance was, as it 
always should be, the servant of war industry and 
not its master. There were no financial bottlenecks 
to the mobilization of the country's human and indus­
trial resources. When resources were available to 
be purchased, the money was always there to pay for 
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them. The financial markets vere orderly, and the 
credit of the government was never questioned in 
the slightest." (62, p. 287) 
One suspects that the final sentence is the most telling 
of all, 
II 
What has the foregoing to do with the term structure 
theory under examination? This period is unique in that it 
represents the Federal Reserve System's largest intervention 
to date. We have here a period when the Federal Reserve and 
the Treasury carried out market policy by debt supply changes. 
Rates were neither legislated nor imposed by legal price 
floors or ceilings; the Federal supported the rate structure 
by changing the supply of various maturities available in the 
market. It was a period when the Federal Reserve System 
decided upon a yield structure and maintained it. 
The interesting features of this undertaking are two: 
(1) the manner in which the yields were pegged; and (2) the par­
ticular shape of the chosen structure. While there was some 
internal controversy about how the yields were to be pegged^, 
as it emerged only the bill and th^ certificate rate pegs were 
made known to the general public. Both of these rates were 
clearly announced in the Federal Reserve communications. The 
^This debate is reflected in the microfilmed minutes of 
the POMC meetings. The Treasury seems to have had some fear 
of too boldly announcing the structure. The Federal didn't 
seem worried. 
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"bill rate, as we have seen, experienced a two-sided peg in 
that the Fed stood ready to either buy, sell, or make a re­
purchase agreement at a stated yield. The bill rate could 
neither rise nor fall so long as the Federal's policy suc­
ceeded. The certificate rate, while stated, was only a one­
sided peg. The remainder of the structure was not stated to 
the market directly, but when one observed the Federal's 
"buying pattern, and particularly the unchanged rates on new 
Treasury issues, it must have been clear to any investor what 
was going on. It is also interesting to note that, as men­
tioned, the peg was, except for bills, not a complete one. 
Federal never undertook consistently to sell when an issue 
began to rise in price. Occasionally it would enter and sell 
when one issue appeared to be out of line, but in the stag­
nationist and war finance thinking of the times, the lower 
the rates the better. 
What is of interest to us is the market response which 
this policy occasioned. The received theory on the term 
structure of interest rates gives several alternative explan­
ations, but these fall into expectations and segmentation 
responses. The purest expectations hypothesis would say the 
policy should fail. A rising yield curve implies that ex­
pectations are that rates will rise. But if expectations were 
as they almost surely must have been, that rates would remain 
unchanged, then the pegged rate structure must have been in-
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consistent with the pure expectations hypothesis. It can, 
of course, be argued that market participants were either 
unaware of the policy or didn't believe it could be done or 
would last. This seems difficult to believe of professional 
bond traders who make a living by knowing what is going on in 
the bond market. We will exeunine the available evidence on 
expectations of rate changes shortly. 
Por the moment, assume that investors believed the Fed 
and expected that rates, particularly the bill rate, would 
not rise. If these investors were motivated by purely ex-
pectational considerations we would expect to observe a par­
ticular sort of market behavior; we would expect that investors 
would flood the long-term end of the market. If rates are not 
to rise, but long maturities yield more than short maturities, 
why not move to the long end for superior yield and no loss 
of liquidity? Furthermore, we would expect to see this shift 
continue until the long rate (and all Intermediate rates) fall 
to equivalence with the nailed-down bill rate. 
There is another alternative. If rates, for some reason, 
do not fall, then we would expect the shifting to continue 
until the Federal ends up holding all of the short debt. 
Either or both of these results should be observed during 
the period under examination if the pure expectations hypoth­
esis holds. To some extent both the above modes of behavior 
were observed. About this there is no argument; the real 
issue is to what extent this was observed behavior. 
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Proponents of the pure expectations hypothesis would 
argue that before either of the modes of behavior mentioned 
occurs, expectations that rates will not rise must be held 
with certainty. If expectations are not held with certainty, 
the pure expectations hypothesis has nothing to say.^ There 
is no way in the pure expectations models for a participant 
to expect, but not with certainty, that rates will rise or 
fall. Once he has made his judgement it must be held with 
certainty if he is to act at all. 
Let us then face the issue squarely and assume that 
investors expected with certainty that rates would not rise. 
We should then have seen a shift to the longest end of the 
debt structure until the longest rate fell to equality with 
the bill rate. It will not do to argue that investors might 
employ a cautious policy and shift only part way out. If 
investors shift at all why would they stop short of the max­
imum attainable yield? Unless a horizon or some similar 
^The exception to this is Malklel (55). Malkiel's devel­
opment allows consideration of rate movement in either direc­
tion but then allows investors to move only to the "long" and 
"short" ends of the market depending upon where the "most to 
be hoped" lies. Thus when the "most to be hoped" end is 
determined investors unhesitantly move there. This is rather 
the same as acting from certainty. The investor is not al­
lowed to hedge or change his horizon when faced with the 
uncertainty of rate movement. Once the maximum expectation 
of gain is established the investor would move to the long­
est or shortest end available just as would an investor in 
the pure expectations hypothesis. 
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consideration is introduced the expectations hypothesis implies 
that, if the expectation that rates will not rise is held with 
certainty, investors will flood the longest end of the mar­
ket. This did not happen. Immediately the cry arises that 
investors didn't expect the war to last forever. Maybe they 
only expected the war to last five years. But this is an 
appearance of the horizon concept which is absent from pure 
expectations hypotheses. Suppose we allow that investors 
thought the pegging would end in five years and then rates 
would rise. In this case we should have seen everything from 
bills to five year maturities yielding the same. This did not 
happen either. 
In short, the pure expectations hypothesis would argue 
that the peg should fail. Either the long rates should have 
fallen to equality with the short rates or the Federal should 
have ended up holding all of the short debt. But the peg did 
not fail. Throughout the entire period, for virtually every 
month, the yield curve displays an upward slope.^ Further, at 
no time do these yield curves display the sort of falling long 
rates we would expect. There are, of course, fluctuations in 
the long and intermediate-long rates, but they are fluctua­
tions, not constant falls. The Intermediate and intermedi-
^The yield curve referenced here is that drawn free 
hand and published In the Treasury Bulletins 1941-1951. At 
the time there were both taxable and tax exempt securities 
outstanding, both of which display upward sloping curves. 
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ate-short rates show the greatest tendency to fall, but again 
not to the extent the pure expectations hypothesis would sug­
gest. Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between rates. 
The contention that if rates were expected not to rise 
the Federal would be loaded up with all of the short debt is, 
to some extent, borne out during the period. There was con­
siderable shifting to the longer end, but not enough to ruin 
the peg. This sort of shifting took place in both the primary 
and the secondary market. 
Shifting long in the primary market is only of passing 
interest to us since it can occur only on new issues, but has 
no effect on the secondary market. The term applied to this 
shifting in the primary market is "free riding". Free riding 
in the broadest sense of the term applied to anyone who sub­
scribed to governments with the intention of a quick resale 
rather than a permanent investment. The free rider, under 
certain circumstances, could subscribe to governments, sell 
his allotment in the early days of trading, and take a profit 
while having used no collateral other than the securities 
(62, p. 177). 
The interest rate peg made conditions right for this sort 
of activity. A trader could be assured that, due to the peg, 
his securities would trade at a premium when trading opened 
and a profit could be taken. When a 2.50 per cent security 
was issued, the peg guaranteed that its price could not de­
cline below par, but if rates were below the peg, as they were. 
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Its price would immediately rise above par thus profit could 
be taken. Needless to say, this led to huge over-subscription 
by free riders. The Treasury fought the practice by varying 
the offers in each war loan, by limiting bank loans for the 
purposes of buying securities, and by appeals to patriotism, 
none of which was very successful (62, p. 192), 
The shifting in the secondary market is of somewhat 
greater concern to us, and some considerable amount did take 
place. The Federal's peg made the System a residual buyer in 
the market. Any security which the public did not want could 
be peddled to the Federal at par. On the following page 
Table 4.1 (15) shows the composition of the Federals portfolio, 
which we take to be a mirror image of the public's desired 
holdings. We see that there is Indeed a massive shift out 
of short-term securities so that the Federal's holding of 
short-term debt reached 75 per cent during the peg and 80 per 
cent at one time after the peg. It would be folly not to ex­
pect some of this, but notice that not all of the System's 
portfolio was short-term. Its holdings of intermediates de­
clined as expected, but its holdings of longs for the most 
part rose I This is clearly not expected. 
These figures are somewhat misleading unless we also 
look at the composition of the outstanding debt. Table 4.2 (15) 
does this by comparing the amount of Treasury bills out­
standing throughout the war with the amount held by the Fed­
eral Reserve. It will be seen that at no time is the Federal 
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Table 4.1. Maturity distribution of the Federal Reserve 
portfolio 1941-1951 
Quarter Years to maturity 
under 1 1-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 
1941 II 4.6$^' 40.1# 24.6% 23.2# 7.4# 
III 4.6 40.1 24.6 23.2 7.4 
IV 4.7 37.7 26.8 22,0 4.5 
1942 I 3.4 36.1 31.4 18.4 4.2 
II 8.4 32.7 31.7 16.0 4.2 
III 21.2 26.8 28.2 12.8 5.4 
IV 25.0 29.0 25.9 10.0 4.9 
1943 I 32.9 26.8 21.2 8.1 4.4 
II 48.7 19.0 13.2 6.8 3.4 
III 59.3 14.3 9.8 5.2 2.5 
IV 60.3 12.8 10.5 4.5 2.6 
1944 I 64.2 9.9 8.9 4.5 3.6 
II 66.4 9.3 7.7 4.0 3.9 
III 69.3 7.7 6.1 3.5 4.9 
IV 78.2 7.3 5.0 3.1 5.0 
1945 I 73.0 6.7 4.5 2.3 7.1 
II 74.2 6.2 4.5 1.5 8.8 
III 75.1 4.5 3.9 1.8 8.1 
IV 75.6 4.3 3.3 1.8 7.6 
1946 I 74.0 3.6 3.3 2.0 8.3 
II 74.1 3.8 3.2 1.8 9.7 
III 75.3 4.1 2.6 1.4 9.3 
IV 75.8 4.4 2.2 1.0 9.1 
1947 I 76.0 4.5 1.9 1.0 9.1 
II 76.5 4.2 1.$ 1.3 10.0 
III 80.4 4.1 1.7 1.7 9.3 
IV 78.2 4.0 2.1 2.1 11.5 
1948 I 61.0 5.8 3.2 5.5 21.5 
II 56.3 11.3 3.2 6.2 22.9 
III 51.9 8.4 3.0 7.0 26.2 
IV 45.0 13.3 2.7 9.6 31.7 
1949 I 46.0 11.3 
1:1 
10.3 39.9 
II 49.3 9.5 8.2 30.2 
III 47.8 9.2 4.7 6.8 31.2 
IV 48.8 8.2 5.9 5.9 30.6 
1950 I 47.6 10.8 7.6 6.4 27.1 
II 44.5 18.0 6.7 9.3 21.0 
III 39.5 18.9 5.7 9.2 16.4 
IV 55.9 11.3 5.4 9.0 18.0 
1951 I 56.8 15.8 5.0 9.1 19.5 
^Quarterly average of monthly data. 
Table 4,2, Total Treasury bills outstanding and those In the Federal's portfolio 
Month 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 
Total Fed Total Fed Total Fed Total Fed Total Fed Total Fed 
March 1604* 1652 c 9234 2106 13147 6540 169 21 12102 17047 13289 
April 1603 na 1953 91 10044 2439 13150 7653 17041 13043 17054 13669 
May 1603 na 2257 156 10853 2454 13666 8490 17049 12998 17041 13903 
June 1603 na 2508 243 11869 3826 14734 8878 17041 12965 17039 14469 
July 1603 - - 3663 567 12460 4907 15524 9069 17025 12819 17023 14413 
Aug. 1604 — —  4168 677 12846 5712 15715 10881 17038 13269 17024 14746 
Sept. 1305 — —  4619 658 13056 5353 15747 10801 17018 13252 17007 14715 
Oct, 1404 — 5126 483 13064 5553 16060 11568 17026 13193 
Nov. 1703 10 5721 388 13074 6171 16405 11880 17026 12611 
Deo. 2002 -- 6627 1021 13072 6788 16428 11154 17037 12636 
Jan, 2100 — 7423 698 13101 6962 16403 11383 17042 12872 
Feb. 2002 mm 8232 1487 13112 6360 16399 11841 17032 13052 
^Millions of dollars. 
^Not available. 
^Insignificantc 
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holding all of the bills outstanding even though they were 
pegged both top and bottom. There was always some demand for 
short debt. Even in the worst financing years for bills, at 
the low point, new bill issues were over-subscribed by 122 
per cent (62, p. 213). 
While the demand for Treasury bills fell more than the 
demand for any security, there was adequate demand for other 
short-term debt. Much of this demand for short debt stemmed 
from the banking system which for the most part refused to 
move out into the long end even as far as it was allowed. 
Early in the wsir period banks were restricted from holding 
new issues which had more than 10 years maturity. We would 
expect banks to be closer to the bond market than most partic­
ipants since banks are dally operants therein. We find, how­
ever, that banks did not shift even as far out as they could 
have. The data in Table 4.3 from Chandler (20, p. 176) illus­
trates the point. Commercial banks continued to hold the vast 
majority of their assets in 1-5 year maturities despite oppor­
tunities to move into 5-10 year and old issues of more than 
10 years. This we would not expect of a purely expectations-
oriented bsink. 
It can, of course, be argued that the market was either 
ignorant of the Federal's policy, or didn't believe it could 
be carried out. Were this the case, the observed yield curve 
may well have been consistent with the purely expectations 
Table 4.3. Bank holdings of debt 
Marketable less bank equals 
governments less bank equals eligible available less bank equals 
direct and restricteds bank held by the bank held surplus 
guaranteed eligible Federal and eligible 
government 
June 30 agencies 
1941 44,073* 0 44,073 4,332 39,741 19,700 20,421 
1942 55,122. 882 54,240 4,591 49,649 26,000 23,649 
1943 99,403 8,711 90,692 9,331 81,361 52,200 29,161 
1944 141,917 21,161 120,756 16,784 103,972 68,400 35,572 
1945 181,728 36,756 144,972 23,771 121,201 84,200 37,001 
1946 190,073 53,459 136,614 25,377 111,237 84,400 26,837 
^Millions of dollars» 
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hypothesis. Had rates actually been expected to rise through­
out the whole war period — had investors believed failure of 
the Fed's policy was eminent or that the Federal would, without 
warning, discontinue the peg — then the pure expectations 
hypothesis may be the complete explanation of the term struc­
ture. The available evidence suggests that this is not the 
case. 
There are two elements to be questioned here: (1) were 
investors aware of the peg and did they believe it could and 
would be maintained? And (2) if the peg failed or the policy 
was discontinued, would rates have been expected to rise or 
fall? For the pure expectations hypothesis to be consistent 
with observation, investors must have believed both that the 
peg would fail, and that rates would rise. There is, of 
course, no satisfactory way ex post to determine ex ante ex­
pectations. The only light which can be shed on this comes 
by making an examination of what seemed reasonable during the 
time. 
The writer has made a survey of literature during the 
period in order to determine the extent to which the pegging 
policy was known, and the reactions to it. It seemed reason­
able to examine the popular literature which was widely circu­
lated, and so The Kew York Times (64) (65)...(83) and Banking 
(8) (9)...(12) were chosen. The pegging and postwar support 
policies were widely discussed both in the sources mentioned 
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and In the academic literature as well (35) (88) (91) (92) (93) 
(103) (104), It may safely be said that the policy of support 
which the Federal pursued as a peg and support thereafter was 
well-known. Not only was it well-known, but there appears to 
have been no significant doubt of the Federal's ability to 
carry out the peg. Further, in none of the articles mentioned 
is there any suspicion that the policy would be discontinued 
before the war's end, and in a majority of cases it was rec­
ognized that financing and stability needs would not end with 
the war. Generally the policy was expected to continue 
throughout the weir and for some time into the reconversion 
period. These statements were made both by private financiers 
and by Treasury and Federal Reserve officials. 
When the peg finally ended, some time after the war's 
end, the expectation seems to have been that rates would fall 
rather than rise I It was not clear to anyone that we had suc­
cessfully overcome the depression and, particularly in the 
academic literature, postwar stagnation was all the rage. The 
Treasury constantly reiterated that it was financing the war 
at low rates with short-term securities to keep financial 
corporations liquid for rapid reconversion, and as a stimu­
lant to fight stagnation (97). Certainly rates would have 
risen had the peg been removed in the midst of massive war 
finance, but this happenstance is not once mentioned! 
The first speculation about a change in the Federal's 
policy begins after the war in late'46 and early '47. New 
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Issues of private securities carrying attractive higher rates 
made governments non-competitive. Also the bill rate peg 
became highly inflationary. In due time it became clear that 
the short rate would be allowed to rise as it indeed was in 
July of 1947. But at no time was it expected that the Federal 
would let the long rate rise. Any adjustment to be made was 
thought to be exclusively the realm of the short-term market. 
And when, after short rates were unpegged but still supported, 
the long market got into trouble, the Federal again supported 
the long rate at 2.50 per cent while letting short rates go 
where they would. This policy continued to the Accord. 
It appears, then, from this too-brief examination, that 
the Federal's policy was known, believed, and thought reason­
ably long-term. This observation does not allow us to con­
clude that rates were not expected to rise or that there was 
no uncertainty about the Federal's policy. The evidence here 
presented must be taken with some caution, but that there 
appear virtually no statements of disbelief, doom, or forth­
coming failure of the peg can hardly be ignored. 
What are we to conclude about the period? It seems 
reasonably clear that there is expectations-oriented behavior 
displayed. While adequate demand for short debt did exist, it 
was no more than adequate. There was considerable shifting 
in accordance with the expectations hypothesis. Clearly there 
were those willing to move out of a natural habitat to scrape 
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up the profits to be had. Undeniably the expectations hy­
pothesis and its variants can explain a good deal of the be­
havior during the period — but not all of it. The Federal's 
supply changes appear to have been the deciding element con­
cerning the shape of the yield curve. The implication is 
that even in the period of reasonable certainty about the 
future course of rates, there are some investors habitat-
bound enough to allow such a peg to work. 
As we saw at the beginning of this chapter, the period 
is one in which there were massive supply changes brought 
about by the combined Treasury-Federal Reserve policy. The 
question we now face is whether we can separate the effect 
(if any) of these massive supply changes from the expectations 
elements. 
We proceed in the next chapter to statistically examine 
the available data. 
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STATISTICAL RESULTS 
I 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: (1) to present 
the results of statistical tests carried out on wartime data; 
and (2) to provide an alternative test of the M&S model. We 
have chosen to use data from the war period specifically be­
cause If there are any supply effects, we would expect to find 
them here. Our approach is slightly different from M&S's 
approach in that we propose a slightly different hypothesis. 
M&S fitted their model to postwar data and then appended 
various supply measures to see if these could explain what was 
unexplained by the lag term. The lag actually estimated was: 
m 
= c<+ ^^rj. + ^^i^t-i '•'l^t* the notation is the 
same as in Chapter 3. With the additions of the supply terms 
the model became: 
«t = + >\f 
In both trials of the model cited, the authors failed to find 
any strong, consistent evidence of supply effects.^ This lack 
of positive results is not surprising since as the authors 
themselves conclude in one of their papers. Operation Twist 
2 
was really not tried. More to the point, there appears to be 
^The reader is referred to M&S*s test results reported in 
Chapter 3. 
p 
See discussion of M&S, Chapter 3. 
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a flaw In the structure of their model. Fitting the lag and 
then appending the supply variable as the only measure of sup­
ply effects assumes that the lag term and the supply effects 
are independent. This procedure assumes that all of the rele­
vant effects of supply activity can be summed up in the sever­
al computed supply measures. 
Rather than the lag term and supply effects being inde­
pendent, we would expect the lag to be affected by supply ac­
tivity. What significance investors attach to past rates 
should certainly be affected by any supply activity in prog­
ress. This suggests that we examine the lag structure for 
evidence of supply effects. This is not to say that the only 
effect of supply will be on the lag structure, but we would 
expect the general shape of the structure to be affected by 
major supply activity. 
To test the above allegation we must first look closely 
at MàS's lag structure and then compare our results with 
theirs. M&S explained their lag structure by hypothesizing 
that the (extrapolative) lag falls faster and is shorter 
than the>Uj^ (regressive) lag. This produces a b^^ structure 
which rises to a single peak and then falls to zero. Figure 
5.1 presents their structure in the upper panel and some 
possible SjL and/v(j^ shapes in the lower panel. It must be 
emphasized that the shapes of the and)L(j^ structures are 
arbitrary. Ve have empirical evidence only on the difference 
between structures, and this difference is, of course, con-
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Figure 5.1. Modigliani and Sutch. lag structure 
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slstent with a number of alternatives« The only a priori 
specification we can comfortably make is that the weights will 
decline into the past. But the rate of descent and exact 
shape of either lag cannot be determined from the available 
evidence. 
The author duplicated H&S's results as a procedural 
check before fitting the model to wartime data. The wartime 
data subsequently examined includes observations from the 
first quarter of 1941 through the first quarter of 1951. The 
short rate, r^, used is the market yield in per cent per annum 
converted to a bond yield equivalent. The long rate, R^, is 
the average per cent per annum yield of Treasury bonds due or 
callable in over 15 years. 
In general, the lag structure fits the data well. Lags 
of between 5 and 20 quairters in length were fitted to the 40 
observations. Lags between 5 and 10 quarters were generally 
unsatisfactory. The structures made no sense and the statis­
tical fits were weak; the Aimon variables were not significant, 
nor were the P values, and the correlation coefficients re­
mained below .60. Lags between 13 and 20 quarters produced 
significantly better results; 3 and sometimes 4 Almon variables 
were significant, all P values were significant, and the cor­
relation coefficients ranged from .87 to .94. The best re­
sults, which consistently emerged at 18 quarters are presented, 
along with the lag structure, in Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2. Wartime lag structure 
18 
= 1.859 • .llOrt + % 
(.008)* (.092) 
•standard error of the coefficient 
(correlation coefficient) = .941 
Sg (standard error of estimate) = .038 
DW (Durbin-Watson statistic) = 2.14 
t values for Aimon variables = 3.34, -2.98, 
4,82, 2.94 
Lag coefficients and their standard errors; 
.184 .098 .019 -.046 -.091 -.115 -.117 
(.069) (.029) (.028) (.028) (.025) (.024) (.039) 
-.097 -.058 -.003 .062 .130 .192 .239 
(.037) (.031) (.023) (.018) (.027) (.050) (.073) 
.257 .233 .153 0.0 
(.037) (.086) (.061) 
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On examination of figure 5*2 we find, as expected, a 
significantly different lag structure than exists postwar. 
Plotted below the lag are arbltrga*y choices for the<5j^ and 
structures. These(S^ and//^ structures are arbitrary only 
in the sense that they are not the only structures which are 
consistent with the fitted lag. However, other structures 
consistent with the fitted lag must have roughly the same 
form; the major source of difference would be the level of the 
structures. 
We observe that thecG^ (extrapolative) structure now not 
only declines more slowly than theyC^i (regressive) structure, 
but actually overcomes it for 8 periods so that the difference 
between them becomes negative before resuming a "normal" rela­
tionship, Note also that the structure is extended from 9 
to 15 periods. This structure is one structure we would expect 
if there were an interaction between the lag structure and 
supply operations. One explanation of this structure is that 
the Federal Reserve-Treasury policy of support to the bond 
market made investors much more sensitive to the recent past 
and less sensitive to any long run "normal" rate. This is 
consistent with a strong expectation that rates would continue 
doing what they had recently been doing; thus, while the6^ 
structure is still shorter than the/>(^ structure, it is given 
a much greater weight in determining current rates than in the 
postwar period. 
In order to fully examine the period and the model in 
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question, a number of additional tests were carried out. H&S, 
in both papers cited, fitted only a fourth degree polynomial 
for the lag structure. On the suspicion that a fourth degree 
polynomial might somehow bind the lag structure to a particular 
shape, a third degree polynomial was also fitted. The results 
are presented and the lag plotted in Figure 3*3• These results 
reveal a different emphasis, but the characteristic shape — 
where the lag structure becomes negative, then rises to a 
single peak and falls back to zero — still emerges as it will 
in all of the tests. 
As was the case with the fourth degree polynomial, the 
lags between 5 and 10 quarters produced rather poor results 
with the best results still at 18 quarters. The structures 
around 18 quarters all have similar shapes, but the results 
deteriorate on either side of 18 quarters. Thus while the 
third degree polynomial reveals different emphasis, the model 
doesn't appear to be completely bound to a particular poly­
nomial. 
M&S, in one paper, tried another test which is tried by 
the current author. Recall that M&S substituted for their 
original long rate (the Treasury average of yields on bonds 
due or callable after 10 years) several long rates of specific 
maturity. The justification for this was that averaging may 
have obscured the true supply effects. Any supply effects may 
have been swamped by the movement of other rates in the aver­
age. For this reason M&S obtained specific maturity data 
Pigure 5.3• Wartime lag structure on third degree polynomial 
R, = 1.957 + .112r, + 
(•Oil) (.088) 
= .870 Sg = .049 m = 1.32 
Lag coefficients and their standard errors: 
.540 .290 
(.263) (.162) 
-.083 -.053 
(.018) (.013) 
.057 0.0 
2.463 1.823 1.297 .872 (1.013) (.766) (.562) ( .395) 
.112 -.004 —.068 .091 (.089) (.o39) (.015) ( .017) 
-.013 .029 .061 .073 (.009) (.016) (.024) ( .027) 
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from the Morgan Guarantee Trust. The data obtained were 
monthly averages of dally observations on rates for the spe­
cific maturities 2, 4, 8, and 12 years. The model was fitted 
with these maturity rates as long rates, and the results were 
nearly as good as the previous ones* 
This writer obtained data from the same source but for 
the war period 1941-1 through 1951-1» Rates for maturities of 
2, 3» 5» 8, and 15 years were used as the dependent variable, 
and the results, with one exception, are not significantly 
different form those obtained with the original dependent 
variable. The exception is Rg where the results were alto­
gether insignificant. M&S find this same result, though not 
so dramatically, and argue: 
"This finding is not surprising in light of 
our model. It is reasonable to suppose, in fact, 
that expectations about the course of interest 
rates in the near future should reflect a good deal 
more information than Is provided by the past 
history of rates appearing in the weighted average. 
On the other hand, when it comes to the more dis­
tant future, the past may still tend to be re­
garded as providing the most useful guide. Since 
the influence of yearly expectations dominates the 
shorter rates and becomes less and less Important 
as we move to longer rates, it is understandable 
that the weighted average term should prove more 
useful in explaining the behavior of long-term 
rates than of short-term ones." (60, p. 584) 
The wartime period results Improve and gain significance 
in the 3, 5, 8, and 15 year maturities. As before, the 18 
quarter lag turns out consistently to have the most sensible 
lag structure and the most significant variables. Figures 
5.4, 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 present the results for Rj, R^, Rg, 
Figure 5.4* R3 Morgein data lag structure 
= ,913 DW = 1.47 Sg = .084 
t values for Mmon variables = 1.81, 1.88, 
4.16, 2.09 
Lag coefficients and their standard errors: 
.036 .199 .487 .575 .529 .406 
(.387) (.181) (.111) (.152) (.159) (.135) 
.250 .099 -.021 -.092 -.106 -.067 
(.094) (.055) (.038) (.048) (.053) (.045) 
.016 .121 .217 .263 .211 0.0 
(.026) (.026) (.042) (.070) (.059) 
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Figure 5.5. R5 Morgan data lag structure 
18 
^5 ~ -721 + .128 r^ + 
(.161) 
= .89 M = 1.52 Se = .090 
t values for Aimon variables = 2.34, 1.91 
3.89, 1.86 
Lag coefficients and their standard errors: 
.058 .129 .510 .647 .618 .488 
(.415) (.162) (.119) (.163) (.170) (.144) 
•313 .137 -.008 -.099 -.127 -.092 
(.101) (.058) (.041) (.001) (.007) (.048) 
-.006 .108 .217 .275 .225 0.0 
(.028) (.028) (.056) (.075) (.063) 
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Figure 5*6. Rg Morgan data lag structure 
Eg = 1.057 + .093r^. • 
(.169) 
= .89 DW = 1.50 Sg = .095 
t values for Aimon variables = 2.65» 1.94, 
3.33, 1.80 
Lag coefficients and their standard errors: 
.064 .094 .503 .659 .641 .517 
(.437) (.170) (.126) (.172) (.179) (.152) 
.343 .163 .012 -.087 -.125 -.098 
(.106) (.062) (.043) (.054) (.060) (.051) 
-.020 .089 .185 .255 .212 0.0 
(.029) (.029) (.059) (.079) (.067) 
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Figure 5.7 R25 Morgan data lag structure 
H15 = 1.512 + .079rt • 
(.137) ^ 
r2 = ,90 DW = 1.60 Sg = .077 
t values for Alpon variables = 3.00, 1.88, 
2.90, 1.86 
Lag coefficients and their standard errors: 
.051 .080 .406 .534 .524 .428 
(.353) (.138) (.102) (.139) (.145) (.123) 
.292 .149 .027 -.056 -.091 -.077 
(.086) (.050) (.035) (.043) (.049) (.041) 
-.022 .058 .138 .184 .155 0.0 
(.024) (.023) (.048) (.064) (.054) 
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and reepectively. The one feature to be noted about the 
Morgan data Is that It uncovers a different relationship in 
the early periods of the lag. The lag relationship now takes 
the "normal" rising form for the first 4 quarters, but then 
the shape characteristic of the entire war period again ap­
pears. Interestingly, M&S find the Morgan data gives them 
slightly different lag shapes in the early quarters also, but 
in all cases, a characteristic shape returns to dominate the 
structure. 
Another test was conducted to ensure that the war period 
results were not determined or limited by the form of the 
data. The Morgan data were taken from an arbitrarily smo­
othed yield curve which raises the suspicion that Buse's criti­
cism (17) might be applicable. The model was fitted to thre# 
different Buse-style random orderlngs and the results van­
ished. None of the Almon variables was significant, and the 
highest ? value obtained was 2.3. 
It seems reasonably clear that the lag structures pre­
sented so far are consistent with the data from the war per­
iod. Putting it another way, our evidence suggests that sup­
ply operations affects expectations; monetary policy carried 
out by supply changes in the market could be the reason for 
the shape of the observed lag structures.^ These results com-
^See Wood (109) and Luckett (46) for evidence of how 
expectations i.e. the weights, are formed. Also Allen 
Soltow has preliminary results along Luckett*s lines indi­
cating a supply-expectations connection. 
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pare favorably with M&S's results. In the following we will 
see what other effects can be uncovered by applying supply 
terms directly to the lag structure. 
Supply variables, both those used by H&S and some other 
variables to be mentioned shortly, were added and the orig­
inal model was re-estlmated. The supply variables, Propor­
tion of Short, Intermediate I, Intermediate II, and Long, 
as defined in Chapter 3 were computed for the war period. 
When these variables were fitted with the lag structure, they 
produced the results shown in Table 5.1. for all presented. 
Table 5.1. Modigliani and Sutch supply variable results 
Variable Coefficient and 
II 
Standard error 
Proportion of Short -1.307 (0.528)** 
Intermediate I 2.250 
(0.713)* 
Intermediate II -0.744 
(1.534) 
long -0.234 
(1.073) 
^The coefficient is more than twice its standard error 
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the Âlmon variables remained significant, the correlation 
coefficients remained above .90, the Dtf's remained over 1.70, 
and the lag structures maintained their previous shape. 
The coefficients, signs, and standard errors are typical 
of those obtained when these variables were fit with lags 
between 14 and 21 quarters long. However, Proportion of 
Short, and possibly Intermediate I are the only variables with 
the correct sign. Since increases in the Proportion of Short 
debt should raise the short rate and reduce the rate spread, 
a negative sign for this variable Is what we would expect. In 
this case, a one per cent increase in Proportion of Short de­
creases the rate spread by 1.3 basis points. This result 
supports the hypothesis that the rate structure is signifi­
cantly sensitive to debt maturity for open market operations 
to be effective in altering the rate pattern. 
Intermediate I has the proper sign only if we are pre­
pared to argue that increases in the proportion of debt in any 
category except short should increase the spread between 
short-term and long-term rates. Otherwise, since Intermed­
iate I is nearer the short-term end than the long, we would 
expect a negative sign. If we do argue that Intermediate 1*8 
sign should be positive, then that same sirgument must apply 
even more strongly to Intermediate II and Long since they are 
closer to the long-term end of the market. This hypothesis 
makes Intermediate II and Long coefficients have the wrong 
sign while being insignificant as well. First differences of 
169 
all four variables were fitted but produced even poorer re­
sults than the veuriable level, consequently the first dif­
ference results are not reported. 
The author computed a second set of supply variables 
from debt information published in the U.S. Treasury Bulletins 
1941-1951 (98). A quarterly series of the per cent of the 
Federal's portfolio held in Under 1, 1-5» 5-10, 10-15, and 
15-20 years maturity as a ratio to the per cent of Public 
Marketable debt in these maturity categories was computed to 
substitute for the previous supply variables. While the new 
variables have the objectionable feature of fixed boundaries 
discussed in Chapter 3, it was thought they would provide a 
summary measure of the Federal Reserve's policy» These vari­
ables were estimated with the lag structure and the results 
are summarized in Table 5*2. With these additions the lag 
structure remained the same general shape, and the DW's, the 
correlation coefficients, and the standard errors stayed in 
the same range as before. These supply variables produce 
significant coefficients only in the 5-10 and 10-15 year-
maturity ranges, and again there are sign problems. We would 
expect the shorter debt variables to have positive signs; an 
increase in the Federal's holding of debt in a short-term cat­
egory relative to the total debt in the category should lower 
short-term rates and increase the rate spread. 
The sign which the 5-10 year maturity category should 
have is not clear* Changes in intermediate debt could either 
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Table 5.2. Federal Reserve supply variable results 
Variable Coefficient and 
Standard error 
Under 1 -•053 (.030) 
1-5 • 027 
(•057) 
5-10 -.431 
(.117)#» 
10-15 .646 
(.205)* 
15-20 .102 
(.201) 
^The coefficient is more than twice its standard error. 
Increase or decrease the rate spread, but whichever it does, 
the same effect should be exhibited by the category just be­
low or above it. If the negative sign is proper — that is 
if 5-10 acts like long-term debt — then 10-15 and 15-20 
should also have negative signs which they do not. If the 
negative sign for 5-10 is not proper, then the positive sign 
for 10-15 may be proper; both 5-10 and 10-15 may act like 
short debt. Even so, this does not help the lack of signif­
icance or the unambiguously wrong signs gotten for Under 1 
and 15-20. First differences of these variables were also 
fitted and they produced results equally as weak as did the 
original variables' first differences. 
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The results of these direct supply effects tests are 
roughly the same as those of M&S. We have found a signifi­
cant variable with the proper sign in Proportion of Short, but 
the remainder of the tests produced spotty significance and 
erratic signs as did MàS's tests. The strongest evidence of 
supply effects is still in the shape of the lag structure. 
To apply supply variables to the Morgan data requires a 
new rationale. M&S argue that each Morgan long-term rate 
(Rg, Rj, R^, Rg, R^^) should be most affected by supply ac­
tivity in its particular range. The spread between any R^ 
and the short rate should then be most sensitive to debt 
maturity changes in the n year category and the short cat­
egory, Thus to each of R^, R^, Rg, and R^^ for the war per­
iod was fitted the lag term and the ratio of Proportion of 
Short to Intermediate I, Intermediate II, or Long. The re­
sults are presented in Table 5.3. The addition of these var­
iables changed significantly none of the lag structures, cor­
relation coefficients, DW*s, or Aimon variables. The debt 
variables themselves, however, show the strongest results yet. 
1 All signs here are expected to be negative : a comparative 
rise in the Proportion of Short should raise the short rate 
and reduce the rate spread. The short-term coefficients have 
the proper sign and t values around 3.00 while the remaining 
variables have the proper sign, but lack statistical signifi-
l^ote that these ratio variables are the reciprocal of 
those fitted by M&S. 
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Table 5.3. Ratio of supply variable results 
Maturity Variable Coefficient and 
Standard error 
3 years 
5 years 
5 years 
8 years 
15 years 
Proportion of Short 
Intermediate I 
Proportion of Short 
Intermediate I 
Proportion of Short 
Intermediate II 
Proportion of Short 
Intermediate II 
Proportion of Short 
Long 
-.240 (.066)*a 
-.257 
(.071)* 
-.108 
(.930) 
-.132 
(.958) 
-.169 
(.185) 
*The coefficient is more than twice its standard error. 
cance. For the short-term variables, a 5 per cent rise pro­
duces just over a 1 basis point reduction in the rate spread. 
This is a small reaction, but supports the hypothesis that 
supply variations can affect the rate pattern. 
Ill 
In order to determine the effect of the entire debt 
structure on the rate spread, a set of orthogonal^ contrasts 
was fitted for each group of supply variables. For both the 
K&S supply variables and the Federal Reserve supply variables 
^Two polynomials, a^^X + agX^..., and b^X • bgX^..., are 
said to be orthogonal if, for a specified values of X, 
Ij ^1*3 = 0 
1 ^ j. 
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a set of orthogonal polynomials reduced the effects to three î: 
linear, quadratic, and cubic. 
When fitted to the original model (using the Treasury's 
average long rate) the orthogonal contrasts of Federal Reserve 
variables generally showed up rather poorly. The linear term 
was significant in one place (14 quarters lag) but elsewhere 
no orthogonal term could muster a significant value* The 
orthogonal contrasts of M&S variables produced only marginally 
better results. The quadratic term was nearly significant 
with t values consistently around 1.80, but never showed 
clear significance. The best fit was again 18 quarters lag 
and the results are presented together with the lag structure 
in Figure 5.8. Notice that the orthogonal variables tend to 
uncover in the original lag the same effects found in the 
early quarters of the lag on Morgan data. The structure rises 
for four quarters before exhibiting the shape characteristic 
of the war period. This effect in the original lag has been 
produced by none of the other variables. A possible explan­
ation is that the orthogonal variables offset the Treasury 
averaging technique. 
The Morgan data was subjected to the same M&8 and Federal 
Reserve variable orthogonal contrasts, and the results were 
significantly better. In Figures 5.9, 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12 
are presented the results for M&S variable orthogonal con­
trasts for Rj, R5, Rg, and R^^. Rg was dropped because of 
consistently poor results and Federal Reserve variable orthog-
Figure 5*8. Lag structure for Modigliani and Sutch variable 
-.753Q + .1330 
(.406) (.195) 
L = linear effect Q = quadratic effect 
C = cubic effect 
= .935 Sg = .042 DW = 2.13 
t values for Aimon variables = 2.22, -2.24, 
Lag coefficients and their standard errors: 
.018 .082 1.141 1.532 1.437 1.064 
(.007) (.113) (.492) (.660) (.641) (.508) 
.557 .037 -.402 -.698 -.817 -.754 
(.336) (.222) (.264) (.358) (.412) (.407) 
-.533 -.209 .134 .383 .375 0.0 
(.348) (.261) (.196) (.182) (.152) 
orthogonal contrast 
18 
4.22, 2.40 
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Figure 5.9. R3 Modigliani and Sutch variable orthogonal 
contrasts 
M R, = .254 + .042 r* +]5[ Gir^ . - .0401 
^ (.015) (.177) ^ i=l" (.348) 
-.830Q + .4740 
(.638) (.307) 
= .959 Sq = .066 DH = 2.70 
t values for Almon variables = 2.35, -2.41, 
6.18, 3.84 
Lag coefficients and their standard errors; 
.025 .043 1.41 1.89 1.76 1.26 
(.012) (.178) (.772) (1.36) (1.006)(.799) 
.615 -.041 -.574 -.903 -.988 -.830 
(.527) (.348) (.415) (.568) (.64?) (.639) 
-.472 .004 .474 .774 .698 0.0 
(.546) (.410) (.307) (.287) (.239) 
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Figure 5.10. Modigliani and Sutch variable orthogonal 
t values for Almon variables = 2.82, -3.10 
Lag coefficients and their standard errors: 
.003 .022 1.89 2.55 2.38 1.70 
(.001) (.187) (.811) (1.08) (1.05) (.839) 
.791 -.127 -.888-1.378 -1.540 -1.370 
(.554) (.366) (.436) (.590) (.680) (.671) 
-.918 -.289 .358 .809 .797 0.0 
(.373) (.431) (.323) (.301) (.251) 
contrasts 
- 1.36Q 4 .3580 (.610) (.322) 
= .952 Sg = .069 DW = 2.70 
5.92, 3.62 
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Figure 5.11. Rg Modigliani and Sut ch. variable orthogonal 
contrasts 
18 
R« = 1.13 • .033r+ • ^ 6.rt « - .163L 
® (.016) (.190r i=lV ^ (.373) 
- 1.75Q • .2500 
(.684) (.329) 
= .954 8g = .071 IW = 2.51 
t values for Almon variables = 3.17, -3.28, 
5.37, 3.14 
Lag coefficients and their standard errors: 
.004 .033 2.26 3.05 2.84 2.03 
(.001) (.191) (.828) (1.11) (1.07) (.856) 
.945 -.164 -1.092 -1.704 -1.929 -1.758 , 
(.565) (.373) (.444) (.062) (.694) (.685) 
-1.248 -.517 .251 .810 .750 0.0 
(.585) (.439) (.329) (.307) (.256) 
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Figure 5.12. Modigliani and Sutch variable orthogonal 
- 1.43Q + .2670 
(.543) (.261) 
= .959 Sg = .056 m = 2.60 
t values for Alxnon variables = 3.37, -3.29, 
4.87, 2.96 
Lag coefficients and their standard errors: 
.003 .004 1.711 2.290 2.093 1.430 
(.001) (.151) (.657) (.881) (.856) (.679) 
.560 -.310 -1.024 -1.476 -1.613 -1.434 
(.448) (.296) (.353) (.478) (.550) (.543) 
-.985 -.368 .268 .718 .710 0.0 
(.464) (.349) (.261) (.244) (.203) 
contrasts 
18 
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onal contrasts fitted to Morgan data are not reported as the 
results were not statistically significant. Notice that for 
R5, RQ, and E25 the quadratic term Is statistically slgnlf-^ 
leant, A simple linear relationship is insufficient to de­
scribe the connection between the rate spread and supply vari­
ables. 
These tests are not particularly encoureiging as far as 
direct effects are concerned. The Federal Reserve variables 
generally produce weak results. The M&S variables, especially 
when used on Morgan data, produce significantly better re­
sults. The strongest direct effects appear for the Morgan 
data in combination with the ratios fitted as reported in 
Table 5.3. Significant results are also obtained for the 
quadratic term when the orthogonal contrasts are fitted to the 
Morgan data. These results are spotty and inconclusive at 
best, but do indicate that some direct affects exist. 
These results are summarized and a few concluding obser­
vations are made in the final chapter. 
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OONCLirSIONS 
We have, at this point, carried out the purposes of this 
dissertation. In Chapter 1 the literature was reviewed. In 
Chapter 2 we examined the effects of a horizon on market be­
havior. After having concluded that both play a role in deter­
mining the term structure of interest rates, the supply ef­
fects, which are enhanced by the effect of the horizon, were 
separated from the expectations elements*. This was done by 
adopting the Modigliani and Sutch model. 
While the results are not perfect, two reasonably strong 
conclusions can be drawn: (1) the distributed lag model we 
have used is indeed effective in explaining interest rate be­
havior. Both independent tests of the model lead to this 
conclusion. (2) Supply effects are clearly in evidence in 
the war period data, and they appear in two forms. The direct 
supply effects exist, but as both this study and K&S find, 
they are erratic at best. The strongest supply effects ap­
pear in the lag term. Indeed it appears that one of the rea­
sons the Fed's wartime bond market support succeeded was its 
ability to influence expectations. This conclusion points out 
the need for further study on the effects of policy on ex- • 
pectations. 
At the outset of this work we questioned whether any­
thing could be done about the shape of the yield curve. We 
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questioned whether the two ends of the market were rigidly 
linked together or whether they could be treated ae separate 
segments. We also had questions about the tools which should 
be used in the bond market. The primary emphasis of this 
paper has not been on developing policy prescriptions, but 
a few observations seem to be in order. 
Our evidence indicates that supply operations can af­
fect the structure of rates as well as the level. This being 
the case, it is then not a matter of indifference in what 
maturities open market operations are carried out* While 
much of supply operations appears to affect the entire yield 
curve, there also appears to be an underlying maturity pref­
erence structure which makes open market operations effective 
in shaping the yield curve. These conclusions arise from our 
examination of wartime data where it was found that large 
supply changes could bring about the desired yield curve. 
We have perhaps thrown some light on the mechanism by 
which policy activity affects the targets at which It aims* 
But the evidence we have exposed is not yet ready for policy 
prescriptions; much remains to be done* Most of the evidence 
of supply effects found were found because we went searching 
for them. To find supply effects we had to go to an exception­
al period in history. Whether the reaction exhibited to war­
time policy could be induced in modern times must remain a 
moot question until such time as the Federal Reserve again 
undertakes a concerted effort to regulate the market. If, 
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when undertaken, the effort is to be effective, our evidence 
leads us to conclude it must be a sizeable effort* But at 
least the evidence that intervention could be effective, with 
perhaps less emphasis on direct controls and more on affecting 
the expectations mechanism, seems to be relevant information 
for policy makers. 
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